Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
History Theses

Department of History

12-4-2006

"Bright, Aggressive, and Abrasive:" A History of the Chief Epidemic
Intelligence Service Officer of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 1951 ? 2006
Hugh J. Kelsey

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_theses

Recommended Citation
Kelsey, Hugh J., ""Bright, Aggressive, and Abrasive:" A History of the Chief Epidemic Intelligence Service
Officer of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1951 ? 2006." Thesis, Georgia State
University, 2006.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/1059625

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at ScholarWorks @ Georgia
State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Theses by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

“BRIGHT, AGGRESSIVE, AND ABRASIVE:” A HISTORY OF THE CHIEF
EPIDEMIC INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OFFICER OF THE U.S. CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 1951 – 2006
By
HUGH J. KELSEY
Under the Direction of Stuart Galishoff
ABSTRACT
The history of public health has suggested that the progress of societies cannot be
understood without an understanding of community health conditions. The federal
government of the United States established the Communicable Disease Center (CDC) in
1946 to assist the states in controlling outbreaks of infectious disease. This coincided
with the early days of the Cold War. The concern of some health officials of the time,
most notable among them was the CDC’s Chief of Epidemiology, Alexander D.
Langmuir, was to address the 1950s threat of “germ warfare,” or bio-terrorism. To do this
effectively the CDC established the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) to train field
epidemiologists as the first line of defense against biological attack. The role of the Chief
EIS Officer was vital to its success. An examination of the Chiefs’ performance from
1951 through 2006 supports this contention.
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For my adoptive father, Hugh W. Kelsey (1914 – 1994), in remembrance of the public
health disaster that at age five changed the course of his life.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) is the field epidemiology training program of what is arguably the
most famous public health agency in the world. The CDC itself is a part of the U.S.
Public Health Service, one of the seven uniformed services of the United States
government.1 The EIS was founded in 1951 to assist the states in investigating infectious
disease outbreaks while providing on-the-job training in epidemiology. The vision of its
founder was that it would be the cornerstone of the agency’s relation to the states. Since
that time the EIS has extended its operations beyond the borders of the United States to
participate in outbreak investigations with health services in over 70 countries. As
described on its web page within the larger CDC site, the EIS program is “... composed of
medical doctors, researchers, and scientists who serve in 2-year assignments, [that] today
has expanded into a surveillance and response unit for all types of epidemics, including
chronic disease and injuries.”2
In the 54 years since its inception, the EIS has influenced the practice and
teaching of epidemiology in the United States and around the world. Former EIS officers
can be found in the health departments of most of the fifty states and in the territories
governed by the U.S. Other countries have established field epidemiology training
programs that mirror CDC’s EIS.3 The administration of the program throughout its

1

The other uniformed services include the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
2
<http://www.cdc.gov/eis/about/about.htm> (13 August 2005)
3
To date, this includes 20 foreign countries with at least one on each continent except Antarctica. Ibid.
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history would not have been possible without the position of EIS Chief Officer. The
serving officer in this role has been responsible for setting up the training program,
running the “match” program4 to distribute assignments, helping to supervise officers in
the field, responding to outbreaks as would any other officer, and recruiting new
officers.5 The EIS Chief Officer position was modeled, by its founder, after the role of the
chief resident physician in hospitals. The purpose of my thesis is to illuminate the
importance of this position in the history of the EIS. The lack of recognition outside EIS
circles can be explained by one former Chief as analogous to public health itself – if the
job is done right, no one notices.6
The narrative history of the Chief’s role must be seen in the context of the agency
within which it exists, the practice of epidemiology, and against the background of public
health history. The first chapter provides a definition of public health, and an overview of
its history through the ages. This chapter touches briefly on the practice of epidemiology,
its advances since 1800, and its link to current EIS activity. The second chapter is
devoted to the importance of the EIS’s work through which the CDC has established its
reputation as the premier public health agency in the U.S. and a force for fighting disease
around the world.7 It examines the structure and progress of the Epidemic Intelligence
Service from the concern to prepare for “germ warfare” at its inception through its
assistance to epidemiologists across the nation and around the world to its current lead
role in defending against emerging infectious diseases wherever they occur. The practices
4

In “matching” the officers to assignments, EIS asks them to place their top 3 requests for assignment in
order of preference. The Chief EIS Officer assists the head of the Epidemiology Program Office (EPO) in
placing the officers in positions based not only on preference but also personal strengths and aptitudes.
5
This includes some exceptions who were not epidemiologists in training but rather were trained
administrative personnel.
6
J. Lyle Conrad, MD, MPH, interview by author, Atlanta, GA, 24 April 2005.
7
September 19 – 24, 2001 Harris Interactive poll results bear this out. Seventy-nine percent of those who
say they understand what the agency is and what it does, rate its performance as “Excellent/Pretty Good.”
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of surveillance and epidemiology, and how they work together to fight disease at the
population level are described here. This chapter also introduces the charismatic founder
of the EIS, Alexander D. Langmuir, MD, MPH, who created the role of the Chief.
Chapter Three examines the experiences of many of the Chief EIS Officers of the last
fifty years. The fourth and concluding chapter examines the role of the EIS Chief in the
context of twenty-first century challenges and opportunities.
This history of the EIS Chief Officers would not have been possible without
extensive interviews with serving officers and former Chiefs. The oral histories collected
and transcribed for this thesis are to become part of the CDC’s archival collection
managed by the Global Health Odyssey Branch of the National Center for Health
Marketing.

4

Chapter 2: A Brief History of Public Health
The stories of civilizations, their development and decline, and migrations and
explorations, cannot be completely understood without knowledge of community health
conditions. Sanitation and infectious disease have always been societal concerns. This
chapter briefly examines the history of public health in order to place the Epidemic
Intelligence Service (EIS) in its world historical context. Before proceeding with a survey
of the discipline, it is important to have working definitions of both health, in general,
and public health, in particular.
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines health in holistic terms as “… a
complete state of physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of
disease or infirmity.”8 It is a broad definition that aims to describe an ideal state of which
harmony and balance are the hallmarks. The key word in the definition, however, is
“social,” implying that the focus is necessarily on communities and not simply the
individual. Around the globe, and at all times, people have lived in groups, in societies.
Through reasons having to do with the immutable laws of human physiology, the wellbeing of individuals is inextricably tied to their fellows. The concept of public health and
welfare, a concern for the “social,” has been in the forefront of people’s concern
throughout history though not always to the same degree or for the same reasons.
Public health practitioner, teacher, and writer Bernard J. Turnock, MD, MPH, suggests
the definition of public health offered by the 1988 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report

8

E. J. Osamnczk, Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements (Philadelphia: Taylor
& Francis, 1985).
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titled, The Future of Public Health. Its mission is described as “fulfilling society’s
interest in assuring conditions in which people can be healthy.”9 John M. Last, MD, an
editor of “A Dictionary of Epidemiology,” believes public health multi-faceted and
essential to the formation and maintenance of all communities. It is, for him, “… a social
institution, a discipline, and a practice.”10 While a physical reality, effective public health
is at the very least also a mindset. Historian John Duffy, author of a history of American
public health, defines it as “… community action to avoid disease and other threats to the
health and welfare of individuals and the community at large.”11 George Rosen, author of
the classic treatise on the history of public health, notes that the challenges of dealing
with people in communities and their health problems derive from the biological needs of
each. From this recognition, he says, there developed the “…signal importance of
community action in the promotion of health and the prevention and treatment of
disease.”12 Thus, concern for the health of the public is part of the panorama of history.
All peoples, regardless of their occupations or their stations in their societies, are engaged
at some time in at least thinking about public health. It makes sense then that the theory
and practice of public health should be considered “multi-disciplinary.”
While the most obvious, medicine is but one of the disciplines associated with
public health. Duffy makes clear that a population’s standard of living has historically
determined the level of the public’s health. In the United Kingdom, for example, infant
mortality decreased and life expectancy increased in some part because of the work of
9

Bernard J. Turnock, Public Health: What It Is and How It Works (Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen Publishers,
2001) 8.
10
F. Douglas Scutchfield and C. William Keck, “Introduction,” Principles of Public Health Practice; 2nd
ed.; (Clifton Park, NY: Delmar Learning, 2003) 2.
11
John Duffy, The Sanitarians: A History of American Public Health, (Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 1990) 1.
12
George Rosen, A History of Public Health, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), xc
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social reformers but more because in the eighteenth century the country’s wealth
increased.13 Understanding the economy of a city, nation, or region is indispensable to
explaining the ebb and flow of public health progress. A relatively new discipline,
community health, for example, has developed in the industrialized West over the last 40
years because of the extraordinary affluence its societies have attained. Its goal is to
identify the health problems and needs of defined sub-populations, specific communities
within a larger population.14 Only societies with the resources to implement and sustain
such practices could develop them into more than just academic disciplines. Their study
and practice shape real human activity. The same could be said of other fields that are a
part of public health, and therefore important to historical study, including nutrition,
education, and sanitary engineering. A recent and growing field is that of public health
law.15
The history of public health shows that the concerns of its current practitioners -sanitation, provision of safe food and water, medical care, and relief from disability -were always important.16 The ancients recognized the need for proper sewage disposal
and for transport of clean water to urban areas. Excavations of archaeological sites from
the Middle East and India to the Americas provide evidence for this.17 In pre-scientific
and pre-civilization eras, efforts to placate deities and to protect both the community and
individuals from “evil spirits” resulted in practices we would recognize and prescribe
today. Duffy reminds us that prohibition against leaving “excreta, saliva, nail parings and
13

Duffy 2.
An example of this would be London’s West Indian community as a subset of the greater London
population. Scutchfield and Keck 3.
15
In tacit recognition of this, the EIS accepted its first lawyer as an officer in 2002. Maryn McKenna,
Beating Back the Devil: On the Front Lines with the Disease Detectives of the Epidemic Intelligence
Service, (New York: Free Press, 2004) 9.
16
Rosen 1.
17
Ibid. 3.
14
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so forth” to protect against spells and incantations provided an effective measure of
sanitation though these practices were undertaken for religious reasons and were not
public health measures.18 Rosen argues that the concept of “cleanliness” being next to
“godliness” preceded the Christian era. He cites the activity of the Inca in ritualistically
cleaning their dwellings each year at the start of the disease-associated rainy season.19
The Egyptians showed a concern for hygiene in their daily ablutions, washing their
clothes as well as themselves, and in their public policies. Workers on the great
construction projects were not allowed to relieve themselves near their work. The
temporary huts in which they lived were burned down annually for sanitary reasons.20
Much of our scientific thinking and orientation comes to us from the Greeks. That
Greece dominated the eastern Mediterranean world is due in no small part to its
hospitable environment. Historian William McNeill declares that the Mediterranean
coastlands were relatively disease-free because grain farming involved only modest
alterations of the existing biological balance.21 Whether they were aware of the reasons
for their good fortune or not, Duffy credits the Greeks with emphasizing the importance
of the environment in determining the course of public health. He points out that this
provided the theoretical basis for the sanitary movement.22 The Greeks, however, did not
take the necessary administrative steps to put much of their knowledge into public health
practice. Any practical improvement in society that was based on Greek theoretical

18

Duffy 5.
Rosen 5.
20
Duffy 5.
21
McNeill contrasts this with the problems of infectious disease control that arose in China because the
environment was much more significantly altered in the course of rice paddy creation. William H. NcNeill,
Plagues and Peoples, (New York: Anchor Books, 1976) 89.
22
This also included the association of miasma and “bad air” (malaria) with the spread of infectious
disease. Though mistaken, it was not irrational and indeed persisted as an explanation for the spread of
diseases such as malaria and plague until germ theory was proven in the nineteenth century. Duffy 6.
19
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knowledge would have to wait for the master administrators of the ancient world, the
Romans.23
While the Romans did little but imitate Greek science and medicine, they
exceeded them in their engineering, architecture, and, to a limited extent, in provision of
medical services. They provided sewerage, bathing, and drinking water supply systems
for the burgeoning cities of the Empire. They paid particular attention to the purity of
water.24 Baths were plentiful and made available to all. An attempt to provide medical
care to the poor was the institution of archiatri, or public physicians. The Romans also
established hospitals for both the military and for civilians. Important public health
improvements in the city of Rome were made under the emperor Augustus. A water
board made much-needed repairs to the aqueducts and enforced the cleaning of streets.
Inspectors also supervised the food supply.25 These were measures public health
professionals of today would understand and approve. Roman administrative vigor
demonstrated what could be done at least for urban areas when the political will,
scientific knowledge, and enforcement muscle came together. It was not, however, to be
a story of one improvement after the other until a harmonious state of public health and
welfare were achieved. The attempts to seek scientific and practical explanations for
health and hygiene were abruptly halted by the disintegration of the Roman Empire and
the rise of Christianity.

23

Roy Porter, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity, (New York: W.W. Norton
& Co., 1997). The Greeks were also hamstrung in equal measure by lack of scientifically precise measuring
tools and belief in the influence of deities on health.
24
Rosen 14-16.
25
Ibid. 22-24. While far from perfect and not always effective, these institutions endured to act as models
for the medieval hospitals founded to care for the poor and disabled.
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While having established a more or less rational basis for ensuring public health
in at least a few areas, the successors to Rome in the Christian era returned to the
irrational and thus rejected the Greco-Roman legacy. Both Rosen26 and Duffy27 confirm
the societal reversion to magic and religious explanations of health status. Still, a key
positive development, from the scientific point of view, of the medieval period was the
use of isolation and quarantine to deal with contagious disease. Venice is credited as the
first city to isolate plague patients and to try intervening at ports to screen goods and
people that might be carrying infection. The first instance of quarantine implementation
took place at Ragusa (now Dubrovnik), a Dalmatian coast colony of Venice.28 This is one
of the very few legacies of public health practice from the Middle Ages that survived the
period.29 The discovery in the 15th century of what Greece and Rome had achieved
sparked the next advances in health as part of general “rebirth” of scientific progress.
The Renaissance that followed the medieval period ushered in the modern age. It
also saw the birth of public health as we now know it.30 Thinking was shaped by such
radical and liberating events as the Protestant Reformation. Catholic scientists felt the
chill that accompanied the trial of Galileo while northern European, that is to say,
“Protestant,” scientists were free to challenge accepted beliefs and to push the limits of
knowledge.
It is perhaps not accidental that “political arithmetic,” the method of population
and environmental analysis essential to public health policy, was devised in post26

Ibid. 28-29.
Duffy 6.
28
Ann G. Carmichael, “History of Public Health and Sanitation in the West before 1700,” Cambridge
World History of Human Disease, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 198.
29
More typical of its legacy was adherence to the “miasma” theory of disease as the cause of the Black
Death, bubonic plague caused by Yersinia pestis. The miasma theory stubbornly persisted almost until the
end of the nineteenth century.
30
Rosen 58.
27
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Reformation England.31 Coined by the physician William Petty (1623 – 1687), the term
meant collection of data on education, population, diseases, and revenue. Numerical
assessment of the population’s characteristics and tendencies was of interest to the new
mercantilist national governments of Europe. In England, the drive for success in the
competition with other nations made this information the basis for increasing the power
and prestige of the state. This led to John Graunt’s (1620 – 1674) beginning the first
statistical method of analysis using deductive reasoning.32 These discoveries formed the
basis of what came to be known as epidemiology, the logical, systematic approach to
understanding the complexity of disease.33
Other milestones were the medical advances of the age that propelled the
scientific and the rational again to the fore after the interruption of the “Dark Ages.” It
was the time of van Leeuwenhoek’s observation of bacteria through the microscope
(though the germ theory of disease had to wait another 200 years); Harvey’s
understanding of the blood and its circulation; Ellenbog, Agricola, and Paracelsus
addressing occupational diseases; and Fracastoro’s first consistent scientific theory of
contagious disease.34 Mercantile princes and governors saw health as the proper concern
of rulers because healthy people were needed to extend the power of the state in the
competition for trade and colonies.
Disruption of this connection occurred during the Age of Exploration, however, in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Adventurers and explorers had stimulated in
people the recognition of their own possibilities in a much less crowded world. It held out
31

Ibid. 87.
Ibid. 87-89.
33
Mary E. Torrence, Mosby’s Biomedical Science Series: Understanding Epidemiology, (St. Louis: Mosby,
1997) v.
34
Rosen 60, 70, 83-84.
32
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the possibility that policy, including that of public health, could be formulated primarily
at local levels without a national direction if one could get far enough away from the seat
of power.35 This was the direction taken in the English colonies of the New World.
Explored in the Renaissance, colonized in the mercantile era, and independent in
the Age of Enlightenment, the United States developed a tradition of public health policy
making and administration centered in the states (after Independence) and localities. Its
development coincided with a betterment of the colonists’ health. The invigorating
climate and lack of crowding in large cities had a beneficial effect on the Europeans. The
diseases they brought with them, however, devastated the Native American population.36
As the colonies grew into a nation, certain themes began to emerge in the history of
public health. Duffy identifies these themes as the effects of the aforementioned rising
living standards, constant alternation between “apathy and sharp reaction at periodic
health crises,” the effects of diverse cultures integrated into American society, and,
perhaps most important, “the clash between individual liberty and the public welfare.”37
The colonies and the resulting new nation would soon need to deal with the disruptions of
the environment brought about by pushing the frontier farther west.
It is true everywhere and at all times that the most intractable of public health
problems have to do with “modernization,” that is to say urbanization and
industrialization. In his book, “The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of
Humanity,” the British historian Roy Porter declares that though there may be differing
points of view about how the economic benefits were distributed “…there can be no

35

Ibid. 91-96.
Duffy 9-12.
37
Ibid. 2-3.
36
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doubt that industrialism jeopardized health.”38 The mercantile, transportation, and
industrial revolution of the nineteenth century caused urban populations to explode.
Cities grew more rapidly than the capacity of administrators to deal with the health
problems resulting from such development and always faster than the will to pay for the
remedies. An example of this is the case of New York City garbage collection in the early
1800s. It was theorized that garbage, manure, and rubbish would be removed from the
streets because the money made from manure collection would underwrite all the costs.
In practice, the city would let contracts but fail to scrutinize the bidders’ fitness to
perform the function. Finally, the city would have to step in as the refuse build-up
became a crisis. Another problem was the spread of the democratic spirit which made
politicians respond to the will of the people. The people were not interested in street
cleaning and most other expensive sanitation measures unless threatened immediately by
epidemics. In the case of New York City and elsewhere, Duffy notes that “sanitary
standards are gauged by the lowest common denominator, and a refusal to accept sanitary
regulations by even a relatively small percentage of the population can negate an entire
sanitary code.”39 The rising, great cities of the industrial West were unsafe and unhealthy
places. The crowding tended to cause disease leading to “family breakdown,
pauperization and social crisis.”40
The response to the challenges of expanding urban populations differed greatly.
Germany favored “health paternalism.” Porter points out that it was easier to do (or at
least to propose) in a society where free trade was not considered so sacrosanct as it was
in the United States and Great Britain, where any restraint placed on property rights was
38

Porter 400.
Duffy 71-72.
40
Porter 399.
39
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strongly challenged.41 When Rudolf Virchow (1821 – 1902) called attention to the link
between public health and social justice, after studying an 1847 typhus epidemic among
the poor Polish population of Upper Silesia, he fell afoul of Prussian authorities. The link
between illness and social unrest, however, was not lost on Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck. He enacted a sweeping health insurance law in 1883 which had the effect of
giving workers and peasants a stake in the existing order and helped to mitigate the
conditions that sparked revolution.42
Revolutions do not necessarily improve public well-being. The French, who
favored health reforms as part of the1789 Revolutionary agenda, saw their resources
instead going to support wars of defense and conquest. After the Napoleonic Era, the
reading of vital statistics told the government of the day that the poor suffered illness and
premature death disproportionately. Its solution was to educate the poor about how to
protect their health rather than to spend money on public health improvements.43
The British did rather better as epidemiologists such as John Snow (1813 – 1858)
were persuasive in getting Parliament to pay attention to the water-borne nature of
diseases such as cholera and to re-engineer waste disposal and water provision.44 Prior to
Snow’s effective use of statistics in demonstrating the origins of cholera, the Benthamite,
Edwin Chadwick, concluded that it was disease that exacerbated poverty and not
incentives to dependency. At first believing that social policies must be directed at
rationalizing the labor market, he was surprised to discover that it was illness, not
laziness, that caused the poor to frequent workhouses. Studies confirming this converted

41

Ibid. 405.
Rosen 422.
43
Rosen 296.
44
Porter 407-414.
42
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Chadwick and others to the importance of disease prevention. This resulted in the first
British Public Health Act (1848) which established the first General Board of Health for
the nation.45
Another important figure in the modern history of public health that emerged at
this time was William Farr (1807 – 1883). Farr was the superintendent of the statistics
department in the Registrar General’s office of England and Wales from 1839 to 1879.
He collected vital statistics and reported them to both health authorities and the general
public. His methods were lauded by Alexander D. Langmuir, MD, founder of the EIS,
who said of him,
[Farr had] abiding faith that natural laws govern the occurrence of a disease, that
these laws can be discovered by epidemiologic inquiry and that, when discovered,
the causes of epidemics admit to a great extent of remedy.46
Farr is generally credited with establishing the first solid basis for statistical
analysis in public health.47 Analyzing statistics as they relate to communities in given
locales is the “bread and butter” work of public health. The epidemiologists of the CDC’s
EIS trace their heritage back to the English physician Snow. His careful, patient work in
analyzing the causes of enteric disease transmission set standards for professional
epidemiology that we recognize today.
Snow attacked the problem of cholera epidemics in London in the mid-nineteenth
century. It was the opinion of the noted American epidemiologist Wade Hampton Frost
that Snow’s achievements were impressive in the face of what was not known at the time.
Diseases that are spread by droplet infection, such as smallpox and measles, had been
45

London at the time appointed its own medical officer of health, John Simon, in part to exempt itself from
Chadwick’s national board of health. Porter 412.
46
Steven M. Teutsch, “Considerations in Planning a Surveillance System,” Principles and Practice of
Public Health Surveillance, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 17.
47
Stephen B. Thacker, “Historical Development,” Principles and Practice of Public Health Surveillance,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 2.
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studied and their modes of transmission were fairly well known. Knowledge of diseases
spread by fecalized water supplies and insects, such as cholera and malaria, however,
were imperfect and open to dispute.48 Building on Farr’s work, Snow brought order to
what was a “chaotic mass of facts” and followed it to a conclusion eventually confirmed
by bacteriology.49 This “triumph” is often pointed to by epidemiologists with pride. As
one former EIS Chief Officer put it, “What was remarkable is that he [Snow] was 50
years ahead of Koch who discovered the vibrio that caused cholera in the late 1890s.
Hence the old adage: Epi[demiology] always leads the lab[oratory], then and now.”50
In America, public health and politics were bound up with religious moralism.
The same disease, cholera, investigated so diligently and scientifically by John Snow in
England, was thought by many Americans to be the result of “sin” which brought forth
calls for the poor to reform their behavior.51 Despite the political and moral challenges
faced by sanitarians, in 1850 Lemuel Shattuck produced one of the most famous
documents in the history of public health. A Boston book seller and publisher, Shattuck
was keenly interested in community affairs. Among his many public-spirited activities
was forming a commission to make a sanitary survey of Massachusetts. He served as
chairman of the commission and wrote the final document, titled, simply, Report.
Although almost no action recommended in the report was taken, Rosen calls it “an
important landmark in the evolution of community health action.” The Report drew up a
plan for public health organization that included establishment of boards to monitor and
enforce regulations and is generally credited with recommending measures, especially in
48

Rosen 262-265, 287-288.
Wade Hampton Frost, “Introduction” Snow on Cholera, (New York: Hafner Publishing, 1965) xiv.
50
Conrad, J. Lyle, jlconrad@mindspring.com “Re: your three documents,” 2 August 2005, personal e-mail
(1 August 2005)
51
Porter 417.
49
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regard to data collection, that were ultimately adopted nationwide in the next one hundred
years. 52 Another important step for public health in the United States was brought about
during the Civil War through the creation of the U. S. Sanitary Commission (1861 –
1865). The Commission aided soldiers in the Union Army by distributing fresh food to
prevent scurvy and to improve nutrition, providing medical services and supplies, and
through its pressure to improve sanitation in military camps which did much to prevent
the spread of disease. Duffy points out that the familiarity of soldiers with the work of the
Sanitary Commission taught many Americans the value of good public health practice.53
Another nineteenth century advance in public health came with the establishment
of the New York Metropolitan Board of Health created in response to the 1866 – 1867
Asiatic cholera outbreaks. Duffy explains that the Board not only minimized the effects
of the disease but was also important because it showed that scientific knowledge could
solve health problems. Instead of dwelling on the social condition of the poor as a result
of moral degeneracy, “Christian humanitarians … turned sanitation and cleanliness into a
moral cause.”54
At the conclusion of the nineteenth century, more and more states were
establishing boards of health, though they concentrated on the health of city dwellers and
largely ignored the rural population. Their lack of funding made them mostly ineffective
but it was still important for the future that the need for them was recognized.55 The
sanitary movement, spurred on by the competition among cities to lure new residents and
businesses, provided better water and sewer systems and brought about an increase in life
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expectancy. The next great change in public health worldwide was the “bacteriological
revolution” that would “profoundly affect life in the twentieth century.”56
The German physician Robert Koch (1843 - 1910) by this time had proven that a
microorganism was responsible for tuberculosis. Koch, in his elevation of bacteriology
into a formal science, and Frenchman Louis Pasteur (1822 – 1896), in his studies of the
relation between micro-organisms and disease, provided strong evidence that the
miasmatic explanations for infectious disease were mistaken. The last two decades of the
nineteenth century saw the rapid identification of the micro-organisms responsible for
disease. This was not, however, sufficient to completely control diseases such as malaria.
As Duffy correctly points out, disease control requires more than scientific
identification. It is dependent on the willingness of citizens to allow government to fix
the problems by spending taxpayer money.57 In the American South during the New Deal
and World War II massive amounts of federal money were needed to drain wetlands in
order to control the anopheles mosquito vector. In Appalachia and other areas of
trachoma infection, government and private groups joined with medical resources to
eliminate the disease by improving social conditions.58
In the first decades of the twentieth century, improvement in communications and
transportation brought the concept of international cooperation to the fore in public
health. In the first era of “globalization,” it was recognized that contagious diseases were
being transported by sea and over land. Some regulation, and hence cooperation, between
nations was required to ensure the health of domestic populations. Nothing demonstrated
56
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the truth of that so well as the post-World War I “Spanish” influenza, a worldwide swine
flu, outbreak. That such a pandemic in the age of bacteriology could kill anywhere from
20 to 40 million people still inspires fear among public health officials that a similar
strain of flu could return.59
While the first efforts at international cooperation in public health go back to
1851, it was the post-World War I League of Nations that made concerted action
thinkable and acceptable on a global scale. The Malaria Commission of the Health
Organization of the League of Nations (HOL) (1923), for example, implied a new
approach to international work in the control of communicable diseases as opposed to
merely prevention of importation from other countries.60 Reviled by historians as a feeble
attempt at international organization, the League nonetheless made significant progress in
public health. The successor World Health Organization of the post-World War II United
Nations (UN) was able to build upon its foundation. The HOL, for example, did
outstanding work on nutrition starting in 1934. As a result of the Nutrition Committee’s
1936 report, nineteen countries set up national commissions on nutrition. It is ironic that
the scientific standards of diet drawn up the League were used first by Germany, then by
other governments, as a basis for wartime food rationing systems.61 Margaret E. Burton,
in her history of the League, described the nutrition study in this way:
It has been said that had the League done nothing else than initiate this study of
nutrition and to provide for continuous international cooperation for the solution
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of the health, economic, and social problems bound up with it, it would have
justified its existence.62
The HOL’s transformation into the World Health Organization in 1945 saw a significant
increase in material resources devoted to global health.63 Its most successful effort, the
Nutrition Committee, became the new UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO).64
At the same time in the United States, many changes were wrought by the
experiences of the Great Depression and the World Wars. Post-World War II Americans
embraced global responsibilities as never before. Fear of the Soviet menace embroiled
the U.S. in a “Cold War” for survival. The populace acquiesced in the establishment of a
peacetime draft of soldiers and much enlarged standing armed forces. Increasing
prosperity had increased life expectancies from 47 years in 1900 to over 60 years at midcentury.65 People began to be caught up in an enthusiasm for science which, while a boon
to sanitarians, exposed health problems that couldn’t be solved by quarantine or
immunization. Duffy points out that public health professionals found themselves faced
with social ills such as “alcoholism, drug addiction, smoking, radiation, environmental
hazards, and … aging” that were outside the normal categories of health concerns with
which they traditionally dealt.66 State health departments found difficulty in coordinating
effective responses in circumstances in which their services had become fragmented.67
Into this landscape the federal government began to insert itself.
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The Communicable Disease Center was founded in 1946 out of the project to
control malaria in wartime training areas of the South. It was founded on Dr. Joseph
Mountin’s belief that the U.S. Public Health Service should provide support to state and
local health agencies.68 To that end in 1949, he brought former New York State field
epidemiologist and Johns Hopkins University Associate Professor of Epidemiology Alex
Langmuir to Atlanta, the new agency’s home, to establish an epidemiology branch. In
1951 Langmuir created what Mountin called “an epidemic intelligence service” to train
epidemiologists and to provide investigation of disease outbreaks wherever they might
occur in the U.S.69 Epidemic Intelligence Service activities are today conducted in all 50
states, territories of the U.S., and in more than 70 countries abroad. Field Epidemiology
Training Programs (FETP), modeled on the EIS, have been created in foreign nations
with EIS help.70
As we begin the twenty-first century, modern industrialized societies quite
unexpectedly find themselves dealing with the problems of success: aging populations,
more expensive health care, and questions about access to it. At the same time it is
curious that public health is almost never mentioned. Some in the field believe this is
because public health has failed to demonstrate what could be achieved if the political
will were there. The opinion of historian Elizabeth Fee is that public health professionals
have not effectively presented their views or trumpeted their accomplishments before the
media, politicians, and the general public.71 Duffy thinks public health is a victim of its
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own success as well as the vagaries of human nature. “… the more successful a public
health program is, the more taxpayers are inclined to feel it is not necessary.”72 The irony,
of course, is that support of sound public health practice has never been more important
as the world at large becomes more familiar and more accessible. Support of public
health policies is lacking in technologically advanced countries which tend to place
exaggerated confidence in medical treatment as a panacea for all health problems and to
neglect prevention.
The most extreme example is the United States where it is the practice of wellfunded medical-pharmaceutical interest groups to generate suspicion of all governmentbased public health efforts. Indeed, since 1980 there has been disdain for all kinds of
public activities, and for the tax money needed to initiate and sustain them.73 This has
damaged the cause of public health by distorting it in the mind of the general public and
reversing the consensus for action. Very early in the twentieth century, and at intervals
since, American citizens have called for government to ensure access to health care.
Powerful interest groups have historically risen up and quashed many efforts in that
direction. Medical journalist Laurie Garrett refers to the American Medical Association’s
coining the term “socialized medicine” as a way to disparage rational thinking about the
topic. In its place, the “body repair shop” concept of medical research and practice has
trumped less expensive, more egalitarian, and more effective preventive measures.74 This
thinking has elevated the status of the medical profession in those societies and created a
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“medical-industrial complex,” about which some writers have expressed concern.75 They
contend that it has produced a faith in medical technology that may be misplaced. Despite
its extraordinary successes of the past half century, many antibiotics have difficulty
controlling diseases such as tuberculosis (TB) that have developed drug-resistant strains.
Garrett states that this inability to effectively deal with a disease such as TB thought to
have been largely eliminated as a serious health threat in America “put medicine back in
the nineteenth century.”76
The Epidemic Intelligence Service, however, still toils in the vineyards of
prevention and control of both communicable and chronic diseases. Its efforts have often
run counter to prevailing medical wisdom.In the early 1960s, for example, bacteriology
was thought by some to be passé. We would, in time, defeat the virulent pathogens that
had so dominated civilized existence. Antibiotics such as penicillin were seen as “wonder
drugs” and the pharmaceutical industry as capable of unlimited achievement. The global
AIDS pandemic has shown that microorganisms are alive and well and mutating at
extremely rapid rates. The unfettered drive toward globalization, interrupted by the wars
of the first three quarters of the twentieth century, has opened a Pandora’s Box of perils
to health. In the mid-1990s, Garrett drew attention to what she called a “world out of
balance.” Penetration of the African rain forest, for example, in search of mineral and
other wealth, caused disruption of local habitats with unforeseen consequences. It not
only brought Westerners into contact with the filovirus hemorrhagic fevers Ebola and
Marburg and arenaviruses such as Lassa fever, but has spread them throughout the
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continent.77 The increased occurrence of both these viruses has raised the specter of
another Black Death similar to the plague outbreak that killed one-third of the population
from India to Iceland in the 14th century.78 Knowledge of how these pathogens are
transmitted and understanding the social conditions that breed disease are vital if people
are to live in an interconnected world. The skill, courage, and dedication of the EIS and
like organizations have never been more important. At the same time, there is
considerable evidence that global public health has taken significant steps backwardis
losing ground in some places.
Russia, and everywhere in the former Soviet Union, is an example of deterioration where
the once effective public health structure has disintegrated since free market capitalism
was adopted in 1991. A statistical example serves to illustrate this. In 1998, every third
recruit for the Army was rejected for health reasons, while in 1985, during Soviet times,
that figure was one in twenty.79 Even the most ardent free marketer would have to
consider what methods government needed to maintain health, education, and
transportation infrastructures. In other places, however, there have been notable public
health successes that have grown, step by step, with the expansion of the global economy.
Singapore, a small country with no natural resources but well integrated into the global
capitalist system, is thought to have the best health system in Asia.80
The history of public health has been distinguished by the effort to address the
needs of communities. In this it recognizes the importance of each to all. The activities of
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the Epidemic Intelligence ServiceEIS, along with the Peace Corps, Médecins sans
Frontières, the myriad non-governmental (NGO) aid organizations, and the various
foundations of the industrialized countries stand as evidence of the belief that we are all
one community in at least some respects.
The EIS, the original mission of which was to support state health departments,
grew up with the CDC almost from the beginning. Hhaving been founded a mere five
years after establishment creation of the “Communicable Disease Center” in Atlanta,
Georgia, it was the logical extension of the view that epidemiology, the branch of
medical science that deals with the incidence, distribution, and control of disease in a
population, was central to the work of CDC. The next chapter traces the history of the
Epidemic Intelligence Service, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
and how it has served the cause of public health at home and abroad, and the role of the
Chief as conceived by its founder.
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Chapter 3: The History of the CDC and the EIS
Dr. Joseph Mountin, Assistant Surgeon General of the United States Public
Health Service (USPHS), Washington, and Dr. Mark Hollis, Director of Malaria Control
in War Areas (MCWA), Atlanta, had a problem. In the early spring of 1946, they were
preparing for a meeting with the powerful head of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), Dr. Rolla E. Dyer, in which they expected Dyer to object to their idea for a new
federal health agency. They had sent Dyer their proposal; now they had to prepare their
defense.
The Second World War was over and Mountin, who conceived the plan, had
envisioned “centers of excellence” which would be created to deal with water and air
pollution, Arctic health, and infectious diseases in the U.S. He was an advocate of the
states and local communities retaining responsibility for public health but felt strongly
that the USPHS should assist them by translating complex scientific and medical
knowledge into formats the public could readily understand and implement.81 The
MCWA, created to control malaria around the numerous Army training camps in the
southern states where the disease was considered endemic, was wrapping up its work.
Mountin thought he saw an opportunity to capitalize on its success to define and fulfill a
broader mission than anything before in public health. The emerging security concerns of
the post-war world would eventually help Mountin establish and maintain an agency
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smaller than the NIH to work directly with the states. He could count on the support of
Dr. Thomas Parran, the U.S. Surgeon General, but would still need to persuade NIH’s
Dyer that the new agency would not be a threat to his research scientists in Maryland. In
naming the new agency Mountin and Hollis had purposely omitted the word institute so
as not to threaten NIH. They had decided to call it the Communicable Disease Center
(CDC) and gave it a scope narrower than NIH in the belief that it would help allay
concern, in Congress and within NIH itself, that there was any duplication of effort or
any attempt at rivalry with the already-established research agency.82
Hollis and Mountin discussed all the possible objections the NIH’s Director might
raise regarding their plan. They planned to argue that the NIH was concerned with
research while the CDC would concentrate on “practical service to the states” and
thereby present no conflict in missions. They thought Dyer would introduce all sorts of
arguments to the contrary, “straw men,” Mountin and Hollis called them, to influence
Parran to reject the idea. When the meeting took place, Mountin and Hollis were
unprepared to hear Dyer say that after careful scrutiny of the proposal he was
wholeheartedly in support of it! Not satisfied with an “easy victory,” Mountin, to the
astonishment of Hollis, began to enumerate all the objections they were prepared to
refute. It was Dyer who knocked down all the “straw men” and solidified the concept of a
disease control agency that would allow the NIH to continue to concentrate on basic
research. “With Mountin’s push and Dyer’s blessing, on July 1, 1946, the Communicable
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Disease Center (CDC) began operations.” CDC’s first location was an office building at
the corner of Peachtree and Seventh Street in Atlanta, Georgia.83
The CDC since that time has taken a lead role in providing technical, financial,
and personnel support to public health activity in the states as Mountin intended, as well
as having assisted, upon request, around the world in the investigation of disease
outbreaks. The CDC also has had occasion to lend its expertise in creating mirror images
of its disease detective branch, the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS), in countries
around the world.84 The EIS’s original purpose was to assist the forty-eight states and the
territories in controlling outbreaks of infectious disease. Attention to chronic disease was
eventually added to the list. With this new agency, Joseph Mountin saw an opportunity to
take public health at the federal level into new and surprising areas. Since 1946, CDC has
added functions, personnel, and budget. Expansion of the organization is illustrated by
the charts below.
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The number of employees has grown from approximately 400 in 1946 to more
than 9,000 planned for fiscal year (FY) 2006. The CDC budget has expanded from
approximately $1 million in 1946 to over 6.7 billion for FY 2006.
The stories of CDC and the EIS are intertwined. The young agency proved its
worth by showing what epidemiology could do to fight disease and improve health. It did
so, initially, by demonstrating that malaria, a disease endemic to the American South, no
longer posed a threat. The CDC moved on to deal with two of the most feared diseases of
the mid-century – polio and influenza – as its reputation grew. The EIS, a training
program as well as an investigative branch created in 1951, five years after the CDC was
formed, led the way. The significance of the Chief EIS Officer position cannot be fully
appreciated without an understanding of the origins and activities of CDC and its
“disease detectives.”

29
Post-World War II America was becoming generally more prosperous and hugely
confident. It had shaken off the doubt and fear of the Great Depression and organized
itself to produce wonders on the factory floor, the battlefield, and in the laboratory.85 The
new “can-do” spirit of the nation at large caused many public health workers to think, as
did Mountin, that outbreaks of infectious diseases that might have been barely noticed at
the national level 50 years before, and accepted locally as inevitable, could be halted.
Changes in communications and transportation made it possible. The conditions that bred
such communicable diseases could also be altered by putting into practice methods of
prevention that worked with larger scale epidemics such as yellow fever. This was a
familiar role for public health. At the same time, the appearance of talented and dedicated
field epidemiologists such as Wade Hampton Frost, acknowledged by some to be the
“father of American epidemiology,”86 at the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and
Public Health, helped to bring about awareness of how diseases could be more
thoroughly understood and, therefore, be better controlled. Mountin wanted the CDC to
be an exemplar of his vision in which the states would be assisted by federal public health
staff. He wrote of this as early as 1942 and said that the occasion of wartime emergency
could bring about an improvement in the health of the general public.87 Nothing remotely
like CDC had existed before.88 To make it work however, Mountin knew he needed a
strong epidemiology branch and an able administrator to run it.
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“The death rate is a fact; anything beyond that is an inference,”89 said William
Farr (1807 – 1883), compiler of statistics in the Registrar General’s Department in Great
Britain during the nineteenth century. Alexander Duncan Langmuir (1910 – 1993) was
fond of quoting Farr, whom he credited with having refined the concept of surveillance,90
to make the point that epidemiology was an investigation and observation science. It was
“detective work” in the spirit of the fictional Sherlock Homes and the tradition of real
world practitioners such as Farr and the famous London epidemiologist, John Snow,
sometimes called the “grandfather of field epidemiology.”91 His field work tracking down
the causes of the mid-century cholera epidemics in London is thought to represent the
beginning of modern epidemiology.92 Langmuir was a disciple of Snow, which made the
Victorian physician’s work important to generations of EIS officers. He was also
influenced by the work of Frost, a strong believer in “shoe-leather” epidemiology – the
practice of personally investigating disease outbreaks at the local population level and not
relying on the reports of others.93
Langmuir had arrived at the CDC in Atlanta from Johns Hopkins in 1949.
Langmuir had been Associate Professor of Epidemiology at Hopkins, from 1946 to 1949,
teaching epidemiology in double class sessions and “going nowhere” as he put it.94
Though the CDC was only three years old, Joseph Mountin, its founder, was impatient to
create an exemplary epidemiology program. The CDC was seeking to expand beyond the
malaria work it did as the MCWA. Although CDC had established an epidemic aid
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program to the states and had a well-staffed laboratory that provided them with excellent
service, it still lacked the key personnel needed to execute Mountin’s ambitious plan to
excel in communicable disease investigation and control. A good epidemiology staff was
needed to act as a resource to the states at the level he had envisioned.95 The person who
took the CDC forward to satisfy Mountin’s ambition was Justin Andrews, at the time
Deputy Director of CDC but effectively its leader.96 It was Andrews who was responsible
for recruiting Langmuir to become Chief Epidemiologist, head of the Epidemiology
Branch.97
At that time, CDC puzzled over how to make the job attractive to the few
epidemiologists in the country almost all of whom, it was noted, already had jobs. CDC
was a place that was dominated by malariologists, entomologists, and sanitary engineers.
In epidemiology circles, CDC was thought to be a place where no respectable
epidemiologist would want to work. Langmuir, however, recognized the fledgling
agency’s possibilities. Unhappy on the faculty at Johns Hopkins because he felt himself
stagnating professionally, he was more susceptible to recruitment than Andrews knew.
There were things at CDC that were very attractive to someone of Langmuir’s credentials
and experience. It appealed to him that Andrews had already started an epidemic aid
program to the states and had set up multi-professional teams to address such problems as
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encephalitis. It was Langmuir’s job to recruit and train the epidemiologists to meet the
staffing needs of these programs.98
Dr. Mountin had “smoothed the way” for Langmuir. Claiming it was a “stroke of
luck” that occurred just prior to his arriving at CDC, Langmuir credits Mountin with
having “read the Riot Act” to the malaria-oriented non-medical personnel in Atlanta who
were seen to have frustrated the attempts of previous epidemiologists to establish
programs there. Mountin warned them that if they didn’t recruit and retain a top
epidemiologist to produce a top-flight program, CDC funding would not survive Capitol
Hill budget cuts. Langmuir was welcomed “with open arms.”99 Having worked for a state
health department just after the Great Depression, Langmuir had insight into the
problems state and local health officers faced. He also subsequently displayed
considerable skill as a “talent-spotter” in his new role which served him well especially
when filling the Chief EIS Officer’s position from among the epidemiologist-recruits.
Langmuir proved to be an effective mentor to those he recruited.100
Besides “investigation” when outbreaks occur, the other vital element of effective
epidemiology is surveillance. Langmuir was a vociferous and persistent advocate of
surveillance. In doing so, however, he challenged its accepted definitions. He was
particularly careful to distinguish between “surveillance” and “monitoring.” Until 1950,
surveillance in public health practice meant monitoring the contacts of people with
known communicable diseases. Langmuir wanted to apply the concept to the broader
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population. He believed surveillance could be done by requiring local physicians and
health workers to report the occurrence of diseases diagnosed in each state which would
yield an overall picture of the nation’s health. Under Langmuir’s guidance, surveillance
information became central to the functions of the CDC.
Surveillance information tells health officials where the problems are, the part of
the population they affect, and where program activities should be brought to bear.101 The
United States has a long history of surveillance activities at the state and local levels,
though not nationally. It is important to note that until Langmuir put the CDC
surveillance system in place, reporting was not timely. This tradition, however, would
form the base upon which the CDC, through Langmuir and the EIS, would help to create
a strong national partnership for the surveillance of both chronic and infectious diseases.
In 1951, Alex Langmuir held a meeting in Atlanta of state and territorial
representatives who later became known as state epidemiologists. He asked them to
create the terminology for describing diseases and to specify which diseases should be
reported.102 Besides standardizing the terms, the meeting, out of which grew the
Conference (later Council) of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE),
demonstrated the CDC’s commitment to assist the states rather than attempt to mandate
what they should do in response to communicable disease. Langmuir offered them
assistance on their outbreaks at no cost to them. EIS officers would be dispatched to the
states when asked for whatever the state health department thought necessary. The states
needed only to identify a single contact that would request CDC help. This person was
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eventually designated the state epidemiologist. Commenting on it many years later,
Langmuir said, “It was a uniquely different approach for the federal government to ask
the states ‘What do you want us to do for you?’ rather than ask what we wanted them to
do for us!”103 It helped to convince the states that CDC recognized surveillance and
reporting were not the same as control which the states believed was up to them.
Part of Langmuir’s redefinition of surveillance placed the emphasis for the
prevention and control of specific health problems in local communities. He let it be
known that surveillance was the ongoing, systematic collection of public health data with
an accompanying analysis. Langmuir also stressed the importance of distributing the
results and interpretations to those who contributed to them as well as others with a need
to know. To avoid any misunderstanding that might either confuse or alienate the states,
he pointed out that surveillance did not encompass direct responsibility for control
activities. As Langmuir wrote in 1963, “These traditionally have been and still remain
with the state and local health authorities.”104 It would be important to the duties of the
Chief EIS Officer to remember that division of labor between the states and the federal
government. Young and eager EIS officers would benefit from understanding how
delicate relations between the two entities could be. When the state and territorial
epidemiologists convened to discuss cooperation in reporting diseases, Langmuir and the
CDC had already demonstrated the benefits of surveillance of a specific disease.
Not long after arriving at CDC, Langmuir had tested his surveillance theory on
malaria, a disease which had been endemic to the American South. The young CDC was
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spending the largest part of its budget on controlling malaria though Langmuir and Justin
Andrews suspected it had all but disappeared.105 Through the creation of what he called
“Malaria Surveillance Teams,” Langmuir sought to employ epidemiological surveillance
of the disease to prove it was no longer a health threat. The teams consisted of a
physician epidemiologist, a nurse epidemiologist, an engineer, and an entomologist
assigned to each state. They would be called upon to evaluate every reported case of
malaria. Assigned full-time to Mississippi and South Carolina and part of the year in
Georgia, Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas, the teams discovered only fifty-five laboratory
positive cases in 1950. Of these, only nineteen could not be explained as relapses, blood
transfusions, or cases imported from other countries. The nineteen were all single cases
with no evidence of clustering, “the ultimate test for determining an endemic
presence.”106 The last time two or more cases of malaria had been reported in relation to
each other was 1942. As Etheridge writes, during the 1930s more than one hundred
thousand cases of malaria were reported each year in the U.S. and that figure was
believed to be low. By 1945, malaria had disappeared for all practical purposes and in
1950 the CDC had proved it.107
By demonstrating how the states and the “feds” could work together to confirm
the disappearance of malaria, Langmuir had set a pattern for cooperation in the future
between the states and CDC and within branches of CDC itself. It was also the first time
that the practice of surveillance was applied to a disease and not just individuals. It was a
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success both for Langmuir and the young agency108 and became “the cornerstone on
which CDC’s mission of service to the states was built.”109 The vehicle for dissemination
of surveillance data would be the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) that
came out of the National Office of Vital Statistics (NOVS) in Washington, D.C. at that
time.
Many at CDC and elsewhere had only disdain for the publication, which they
thought was little known or respected, but Langmuir saw it as vital to communicating
surveillance analysis to those who could and should act – the states and local
communities. Based on a 1959 recommendation from an EIS officer who would later
become Surgeon General of the United States, Dr. William H. Stewart (EIS 1951), the
MMWR was transferred from NOVS to CDC in January 1961. It immediately expanded
under CDC guidance to three pages of narrative, including editorial comments, and one
page of tables.110 Its circulation in 1961 was 6,000. The MMWR has influenced the
creation and format of similar journals of epidemiology published by the WHO and by
other countries.111 The CDC editorial staff, consisting mostly of Epidemiology Program
Office personnel, solicited comments for the articles from CDC staff. In this way,
epidemiology became central to CDC’s mission.
Epidemiology is the mathematical study of disease occurrence and the
identification of disease risk factors, or any health-related event, in a population.
Epidemiology is interdisciplinary. Any study of a disease may include methodologies and
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knowledge from other scientific fields including anthropology. As previously mentioned,
it is very much like detective work in that it requires creative, critical thinking in drawing
inferences in order to arrive at reasonable conclusions.112 It is considered to be the basic
science of public health which is itself concerned with population characteristics.113
Epidemiologists can be drawn from many disciplines and not just medicine. As well as
physicians, nurses, and veterinarians, the current professional categories for EIS
eligibility include statisticians, sanitary engineers, chemist/biochemists, demographers,
pharmacologists, dentists, toxicologists, mycologists, microbiologists, sociologists,
clinical physiologists, anthropologists, industrial hygienists, nutritionists, and even
lawyers.114 The key skill an epidemiologist must have, that should be common to all no
matter what their backgrounds, is the ability to reason deductively. Rather than
memorizing facts, epidemiologists must be able to think critically and creatively.115 At
the CDC, epidemiology training and investigative activities are managed by the
Epidemiology Program Office (EPO). The EIS is a branch of the EPO’s Division of
Applied Public Health training. (see organizational chart below)
“What we need is an epidemic intelligence service,” said Joseph Mountin one
day in 1951. He was reflecting on the need of CDC to prepare for the Cold War danger of
“germ warfare,” epidemics induced by biological agents deliberately let loose on
American soil by enemy operatives.116 This was the first recorded use of the name that
eventually stuck to the CDC’s famed “disease detectives.” The EIS would be supported
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with “germ warfare” funds but it would be used to investigate disease outbreaks, both
chronic as well as infectious, anywhere in the states and, eventually, in the world. The
EIS would be a training program for epidemiologists as well as a “rapid deployment
force” when epidemics arose. The Chief EIS Officers would be instrumental in gathering
young people to embrace EIS’s twin missions of surveillance and investigation
assistance. The organization of EIS and EPO has evolved over the years. An explanation
of their missions makes their relationship and functions clear.
The Epidemiology Program Office started as the Epidemiology Branch under
Alex Langmuir in 1949. Today, its mission consists of four major functions. The first is
to facilitate public health communications which it does by publishing MMWR
(Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report), CDC Surveillance Summaries, and
Recommendations and Reports. The second is promote prevention research and analytic
methods by serving as a catalyst for statistical methodology, the employment of
behavioral and social sciences in the service of public health, demonstrating prevention
effectiveness, and incorporating new disciplines in public health practice such as the uses
of information technology. The third function of public health training includes
sponsorship of the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS), the Preventive Medicine
Residency (PMR) to advance application of epidemiology, the Public Health Prevention
Service which is a three-year program in public health program planning, implementation
and evaluation; and the Field Epidemiology Training Programs (FETP) which, since
1975, have established applied epidemiological methods in countries around the world, as
well as other fellowship and internship programs. The fourth function of EPO is public
health surveillance and informatics, the use of information technology in the tracking and
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reporting of disease. The purpose is to maximize the efficiency of existing information
systems while developing new and innovative methodologies.117
The EIS is a 2-year post graduate fellowship of service and on-the-job training for
health professionals interested in applied epidemiology. Its mission is to respond to
requests for epidemiologic assistance in the U.S. and around the world. That response
includes prevention of injury and disease as well as the control of each, the promotion of
health, and the effort to build public health capacity in the states and abroad. The
individual officers receive training in the applied epidemiological skills of quantitative
analysis, research design, epidemiologic judgment, and health communications. The
professional skills and abilities that officers are expected to acquire through this program
are learned through “hands-on” experience at investigating acute disease outbreaks,
analyzing large data bases of health information, evaluating surveillance systems,
publishing and presenting scientific manuscripts, and answering public inquiries. Their
assignment can be either “Headquarters” (CDC branches in Atlanta) which provide a
specialist focus or “Field” assignment to a state or local health department from which
officers derive a general view of public health practice.118
At the CDC, the EIS was established, in part at least, as a training course for
epidemiologists. When Alex Langmuir went to recruit “disease detectives,” he found
there were very few available. His efforts to obtain qualified candidates turned up only
“two young physicians who were genuinely interested but totally untrained.”119 It was
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then that he decided that he would train eager, young physicians and other specialists to
be the epidemiologists the EIS program needed. The first class of recruits began training
in the summer of 1951. They would be learning and working for the CDC’s
Epidemiology Branch. The threat of biological warfare stemming from involvement in
both the Cold War with the Soviet Union and the shooting war in Korea created a sense
of urgency within the federal government. Epidemiologists would be needed in case of
sudden disease outbreaks. The EIS officers could learn the requisite investigative skills
working on conventional outbreaks. It would, Langmuir reasoned, prepare them for a
deliberately man-made infectious disease outbreak. By creating this quick-reacting field
force, CDC hoped to strengthen its relationship to the states. Service to the states, when
invited, was always the most important part of the EIS’s mission. In order to do it well, it
had to fulfill the other part – recruit and train field-savvy epidemiologists.120
The training itself consisted of the Introductory Course on epidemiology and
public health. This course was, and still is, taught over the whole month of July. Its focus
was turning competent physicians (in the early years, the classes were almost all
physicians) used to treating patients one at a time into professionals concerned with
population health. The group was now their “patient.” From the beginning, EIS training
would emphasize statistics which gives epidemiology what Etheridge calls “a scientific
tradition.”121 Langmuir demonstrated that the principles of epidemiology could be
expressed mathematically as they could for disciplines such as physics and
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chemistry.122After the month-long course, the officers were assigned to their posts. Most
stayed in Atlanta where they served in various branches of the CDC while being ready to
travel to an investigation at a moment’s notice. The rest of the epidemiologist-trainees
were assigned to state and municipal public health departments. The Epidemic Aid
cooperative agreement program started by Justin Andrews was the vehicle for getting the
EIS on the scene of an outbreak.123 Langmuir then had to make sure they learned as well
as performed on the job. From the beginning Langmuir had faith that even inexperienced
people could do things well even though they had not done them before. The key was
choosing the right people. His program was thus dependent on the recruiting and
selection process. It was here that the Chief’s role would be crucial. Once the officers
were in the field, Langmuir believed that regular communication between them and the
experts at CDC would see them through. His method was to guide the officers through a
critical examination of an ongoing investigation. Langmuir also knew that the trainees
would need solace and encouragement should things not work out as hoped the first time
around. As one veteran remembered, “The tone of the supervision was supportive, not
authoritarian.” The support mechanism was similar to that of the clinical house staff
training structure found in teaching hospitals. In this system, the intern has direct
responsibility for the patient but is guided by senior residents and attending physicians.
Langmuir, who had experienced such a system when at Boston City Hospital, claimed
that it influenced his design of this program of a teaching service in the “public health
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emergency room”124 The role of the EIS Chief was patterned after that of the Chief
Resident in a clinical setting such as a teaching hospital.125
Another structure Langmuir put in place was the annual EIS Conference, held
each April in Atlanta. To reinforce his belief that epidemiology was to be practiced with
scientific rigor, the conference consisted of ten-minute reports by officers on their
investigations with an equal amount of time for fielding questions in open scientific
discussion from attendees. The attendees were other current officers, CDC supervisory
staff, and former officers. Langmuir himself set the tone for the exchange by always
emphasizing a positive aspect of the investigation though he would follow up with
“penetrating” questions. In this way the conference served to establish EIS field
epidemiology as a discipline where “new information should be produced, and the results
openly displayed and subject to constructive critique.”126 The EIS Chief would have
primary responsibility for setting up and running the conference.
After completing training and serving for two years, the newly-trained
epidemiologists were under no obligation to remain in the Public Health Service. It was
Langmuir’s hope, however, that a reasonably high percentage would stay in the field and
so allow CDC to better fulfill its mission to the states.127 As it turned out, they remained
in numbers large enough to justify Langmuir’s faith in the power of the endeavor to
inspire. The CDC each year recruits a majority of those who have completed
epidemiology training to work in its various branches on problems of public health. The
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annual EIS Conference provides the occasion and the opportunity for various CDC
branch and program administrators to “pitch” their recruiting messages to class members.
In this way, epidemiology pervades the CDC and informs its practice.
The case of Reye’s syndrome in children and its relation to aspirin provides an
example of CDC epidemiology shedding light on the problems surrounding the incidence
of a specific disease. Reye’s syndrome is primarily a children’s disease that usually
occurs after cases of influenza or chicken pox.128 Approximately one year after the 1976
swine influenza effort, EIS officer Dr. Karen Starko, who had been assigned to the
Arizona Health Department, noticed a connection between the onset of Reye’s syndrome
and the use of aspirin to treat the symptoms of chicken pox and flu viral infections.129
Starko had monitored a flu outbreak that resulted in seven children contracting Reye’s
syndrome. As a trained epidemiologist, she asked detailed questions about the care and
treatment the patients had received. What she discovered was that those children who had
contracted the disease had taken aspirin more frequently than those who did not.
Unsure of the connection, she called Dr. Lawrence Shonberger in Atlanta.
Schonberger, the Deputy Chief of the Enteric and Neurotropic Disease Branch, thought
that her observations should be compared to the information the CDC gathered in the
state of Ohio during the swine flu campaign. The surveillance information verified the
connections between Reye’s and influenza but until the time of Starko’s observation no
one had noticed the aspirin connection. The Ohio data would be reassessed and a new
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study was conducted in Michigan. Less than a year later the epidemiological studies in
Ohio and Michigan, coupled with Starko’s observations in Arizona, confirmed that
children treated with any amount of aspirin for either flu or chicken pox were more likely
to get Reye’s syndrome than those who did not.
The first report on salicylates was published in MMWR during the summer of
1980.130 A few months later, details from the Ohio and Michigan studies were reported
there also. The aspirin industry asked for more time to present more information before
CDC published its definitive study complete with statistics from Arizona, Ohio, and
Michigan. The epidemiologists assigned to the investigation, however, had looked at
many factors that might contribute to the greater likelihood of Reye’s appearing in some
viral infection patients and not others. Their study covered the time period of the
antecedent illnesses and the onset of Reye’s syndrome. This revealed that the peak of
Reye’s incidence was one week after the peak of reported influenza outbreak cases which
was mentioned in the MMWR. Its article pointed out that the onset of Reye’s syndrome
in flu patients was consistent with what the investigators expected to see; “presumably
reflecting the [expected] 5-7 day interval between antecedent illness and hospitalization
with Reye’s syndrome.”131 Controlling for factors such as mean duration of viral illness,
mean age of parents, mean number of medications received during the viral illness, and
mean peak temperature reported, the reviewers concluded that these factors were similar
for both. The results of CDC investigations in Arizona, Ohio, and Michigan, and a fourth
study by the Michigan Department of Health, showed Dr. Starko’s observation to have
merit.
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Despite the weight of the evidence, the aspirin industry fought to delay making
the findings public. The CDC was pressured to modify its conclusion. Dr. Walter
Dowdle, CDC Deputy Director at the time, said that not even the problems of the swine
flu campaign prepared the agency for the political and economic pressure it received to
modify its stance on the aspirin connection.132 CDC’s findings prevailed, however, and
the aspirin industry started issuing warning labels on their products in 1986. While the
industry was congratulated on its “public spiritedness,” former CDC Director, Dr.
William Foege said, “In fact they avoided letting parents know for more than a year that
there was problem with aspirin. It shows how strong the profit motive … can be in trying
to make good health decisions.”133 The number of Reye’s syndrome cases plummeted
thereafter. A decade later Foege said of the Reye’s syndrome and other CDC/EIS
investigations, “These measures illustrate that public health policy is absolutely
dependent on the best epidemiology possible.”134 Alexander Langmuir and the EIS
insisted from the beginning that not only was investigation results to be made public, but
that measures for control and prevention were to be recommended. The Reye’s syndrome
case is a good example of how impeccable field epidemiology resulted in health policy
change.
After they concluded their first month’s training, EIS officers were given
assignments through the “match” program. This was the system devised by Langmuir and
executed by the Chiefs wherein the recruits were encouraged to request their top three
preferences for assignment. The director and Chief EIS officer would review the requests
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and “match” the requesters with the perceived needs of the CDC as expressed by the
branch chiefs. In this way, the year’s class would begin its work. Langmuir knew that
process of investigation is dependent on the quality of the investigator. A large part of the
Chief’s job was to help recruit good prospects, develop their investigation skill through
training and experience, and to maintain them in the field.135
In the early months of the EIS’s existence, whenever an epidemic alert came in to
the CDC, someone immediately contacted the NIH. It was part of CDC’s agreement with
that agency that it would handle only investigations NIH refused.136 CDC knew it had to
be prompt in responding if it was to live up to its promise to investigate all outbreaks. A
device created to help handle the requests was the Epidemic Aid Memorandum or “Epi 1
memo.” A simple administrative device, the Epi 1 memo, was circulated whenever a
request came in. At first limited in circulation to only a few staff members, the list was
eventually distributed to over two hundred.137 In 1952, its first full year of existence, the
small cadre of EIS officers responded to over two hundred calls for help. Langmuir and
his recruits took a great deal of pride in how many outbreaks they could cover, their rate
of success, and how quickly they could do it. State health officers were surprised by the
speed with which CDC’s “disease detectives” responded to their investigation requests.
As Langmuir tells it, “[they] were astounded to find bright, young, responsive,
epidemiologists in their offices the next morning, or even sometimes the same day that
they called. Each epidemic aid call was an adventure and a training experience, even the
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false alarms.”138 In 1955, Langmuir had the opportunity to conduct surveillance of a
disease in an emergency situation and then provide epidemiological support to alleviate
the problem. It was a chance for the fledgling EIS to show what it could do in a major
crisis and Langmuir seized it. The disease in question was poliomyelitis.
Polio in the early1950s terrified the public. It was recognized in the U.S. around
the mid-nineteenth century and, after 1900, struck small towns and big cities each
summer crippling rich and poor alike. The most famous polio victim in America was
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882 – 1945) who contracted it at age thirty-nine while
vacationing in Maine. There were major outbreaks in New York (1916) and Los Angeles
(1934) which, because they occurred in large crowded cities, caused considerable panic
and contributed to the dread reputation of the disease.139 Public health officials had been
aware of polio since a British physician, Dr. Michael Underwood, in 1789 described a
debilitating illness of the lower extremities. Archeological evidence of polio in ancient
Egypt was gleaned from an illustration on a stele of a man with a withered leg leaning on
a staff. Although present in the United States at least since 1843, the first significant
outbreak of poliomyelitis occurred in 1894.140 The 1916 New York outbreak caused both
American and European researchers to devote unprecedented resources to studying the
disease.141 It was President Roosevelt’s law partner, Basil O’Connor (1892-1972), who
created the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (NFIP) in 1938, later renamed the
March of Dimes, to combat the disease through research.

138

Ibid.
John R. Paul, A History of Poliomyelitis, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 1 passim.
140
Ibid.
141
Global Polio Eradication Initiative/History <http://www.polioeradication.org/history.asp > 8 September
2005.
139

48
The CDC itself was not unfamiliar with polio. The EIS, in fact, had made a mark
in the study of this disease when it responded to an outbreak of polio in Paulding County,
Ohio in September 1950. For the first time anywhere in the world, a comprehensive
epidemiological study of poliomyelitis was made. A team of thirty people undertook an
examination of not only patients but family members, pets, and livestock. They analyzed
blood samples from all and even trapped insects and rodents. In the end, the team was
unable to say why this particular geographic area was the target for the epidemic but they
learned what to do, and what not to do, in an epidemiological investigation of the
disease.142 At almost the same time, researchers had succeeded in growing live polio
virus in living cells which paved the way toward developing a vaccine to prevent the
disease.143
Dr. Jonas Salk (1914-1995) of the University of Pittsburgh grew large amounts of
pure polio virus with which to experiment. Salk was one of the developers of an influenza
vaccine using a “killed” virus that conferred immunity. Salk believed he could do the
same with polio. The risk was low: killed viruses could not infect recipients with the
disease. After experimenting with a vaccine, Salk was ready in 1953. The disease toll
from the previous two years lent urgency to the 1954 effort.144 O’Connor and the NFIP
backed Salk’s one-year trial at a cost of $7 million. It would eventually succeed in
vaccinating 441,000 children with another 201,000 receiving placebos. Over 1 million
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more children were observed as a way to monitor infection rates.145 The “Francis Field
Trials,” named for Dr. Thomas Francis, Jr. (1900-1969), the chief monitor, took three
months to complete. The EIS class that year spent months working in New York City
during the surveillance and follow-up activities. It took another nine months to tabulate
the results. Begun on April 26, 1954, the trial’s findings were announced on April 12,
1955. That the effort was successful was “unequivocally stated” by Dr. Francis in a press
conference at the University of Michigan.
Lost in all the enthusiasm of the trial’s success was the understanding that a larger
group of manufacturers would be producing the vaccine than had participated in the
trials. This fact should have alerted the vaccine Licensing Committee to carefully
supervise vaccine manufacture.146 There was also a problem with the study’s population.
Physician and historian John Paul points out that the Licensing Committee was under
considerable duress at this time to get the vaccine in circulation and perhaps a little too
hastily concurred with the data compiled during the trial. Given more time to study the
results, they might have echoed Professor William Cochran, statistician from Harvard
University, who told Langmuir that he believed the size of the sample was too small.147
Langmuir reviewed the case rates and controls and felt it was just enough to give it
statistical validity. (He eventually wrote a case study utilizing the data from the Francis
trials that was used in the EIS course for at least ten years.) Though little noticed at the
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time, one of the six manufacturers chosen to produce the Salk inactivated polio vaccine
was Cutter Laboratories in Berkeley, California.148
The CDC had prepared to perform nationwide surveillance of poliomyelitis
anticipating two problems: the failure of the vaccine’s potency and the possibility that
diseases simulating polio would make evaluation of the vaccination effort difficult. As
Etheridge writes, “They considered and discarded the problem of vaccine safety. That,
after all, had been the concern of the Francis field trials.”149 When verifiable cases of
polio turned up in vaccinees within two weeks of the start, the entire vaccination effort
was in jeopardy. Alex Langmuir was in Washington, D.C. as the first reports trickled in
describing the cases. He attended the meeting which was originally called to discuss
rationing the scarce vaccine but instead considered whether or not to stop the campaign.
Langmuir argued the virtues of a national surveillance program for polio in order to track
the problem. Cutter Labs, whose product was implicated in the polio cases, withdrew its
vaccine from distribution. The Surgeon General, Leonard Scheele, held off making any
decision to suspend the vaccination program until he spoke to the powerful O’Connor.
Thinking he had failed to be convincing about the need for surveillance, Langmuir
sullenly returned to the CDC office in the Department of Housing, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) Building. A few minutes later, a public affairs officer, Mary Ross,
showed Langmuir a press release from the surgeon general announcing the establishment
of a national polio surveillance program at CDC headed by Alex Langmuir! Etheridge
writes that Langmuir was “dumbfounded.” As he told it,
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I asked her what had happened. It was clearly not the decision of the group I just
left. She smiled and said, “The SG [surgeon general] has a whole room full of
national news reporters he must meet with now. He asked me what he should say.
I replied by showing him a news release I drafted in the late afternoon, because
what you were saying made the most sense and the SG had to say something!”150
A top secret meeting was convened for Friday, April 29 to discuss the Cutter
incident. There was fear that the whole program was becoming a “disaster,” although no
one dared use the word in public.151 Surgeon General Scheele announced that the
vaccinations would be suspended while the safety of the polio vaccine production would
be assessed on a plant-by-plant basis. Responding to the emergency, Langmuir created
the “Poliomyelitis Surveillance Unit” (PSU) of CDC and assigned EIS officer Neal
Nathanson to it. The unit was charged with the collection, collation, and analysis of polio
case information reported by state epidemiologists and EIS officers in the field. The PSU
issued daily reports for about five weeks and once a month thereafter.152
Although it was difficult to track with complete accuracy, Langmuir was sure that
a clear picture of the problem would emerge despite some flaws in the data.153 The
disease detectives had narrowed the cause of the polio cases to only two lots of Cutter
vaccine. So convinced by this evidence was the by now much more cautious Division of
Biologics Standards154 that it re-cleared the vaccine for distribution. As Nathanson wrote
more than forty years later, “… Langmuir had persuaded the public health authorities that
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the problem was with a single manufacturer and not with the vaccine itself ... [and] the
vaccine of the four other manufacturers should be re-released promptly.” Langmuir’s
faith in surveillance and the skill of the EIS officers involved in the investigation restored
public confidence in the poliovirus vaccine.155 The Communicable Disease Center as a
concept had proved its worth.156
Langmuir assigned one of the EIS officers from the PSU, E. Russell Alexander, to
develop a section of the CDC that would conduct a series of national surveillance
activities. Alexander writes that Langmuir was planning the creation of this unit for years
and saw the time was right for initiating it. Typical of Langmuir’s respect for the states
and dedication to CDC’s mission to support them was his insistence that the surveillance
section obtain the backing of the state epidemiologists for any activity it undertook.157
Etheridge notes the approbation Langmuir and CDC received from the Cutter incident.
The EIS and the Polio Surveillance Unit had confirmed the vaccine was overwhelmingly
effective and completely safe, and that the vaccination program, if applied properly,
would ensure there would be no polio epidemic in 1956. They had proven that
surveillance was essential to controlling epidemic disease. The New York Times called
Alex Langmuir the nation’s “leading medical intelligence officer.”158
The next big challenge, influenza, followed hard on the heels of polio. It also
added to CDC’s laurels while demonstrating that concern for global aspects of disease
control was properly part of the Epidemic Intelligence Service’s mission. Virologists
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agree that influenza is a disease that must be watched carefully. Bio-medical research has
been unable to offer a permanent solution to the problem posed by group A (there are
four strains: A-D, with only A and B a concern to the U.S.) and its ability to either
“drift,” change slightly, or “shift,” mutate into something against which the population
has little or no immunity.159 In 1957, the type A flu shifted into a deadly strain (H2N2)
known as the Asian flu. It got that name after the epidemic began in Hong Kong with the
sickening of over a quarter million people in that city alone. American servicemen in
Asia brought the virus to the U.S. in June of 1957 and it spread rapidly. The Surgeon
General, Dr. Leroy Burney, requested that Langmuir monitor the outbreak. “Tell Alex to
set up surveillance for influenza as he did for polio.”160 The surveillance unit for
influenza consisted of people from both the Epidemiology and Laboratory branches,
always rivals in the past, now working closely together in this effort. CDC personnel also
volunteered to the test the newest vaccines produced to counter the epidemic. The
surveillance unit set up by CDC to monitor the Asian flu discovered a great deal about
the nature and progress of the disease. Because it was known how the illness was spread,
and who was most susceptible at any given time during the various waves of the
epidemics, measures were taken to limit the effects. A vaccine was produced and tested
by CDC personnel. An EIS officer, Dr. Bruce Dull, conducted tests on volunteers at the
federal penitentiary in Atlanta that proved the vaccine 80%-90% effective in the first
round of vaccinations and slightly less in the second. The demand for the vaccine was
greater than the supply and the country did not yet have a distribution plan. Surveillance
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of the disease indicated that since people over 65 years of age constituted most of the
86,000 excess deaths the vaccine should be administered first to the elderly and the
chronically ill. Langmuir’s EIS had again proven its worth to the country. Etheridge notes
that Langmuir even made an appearance on national television – a first for CDC – to
explain the origin, spread, control, and outlook of Asian flu.161 (Influenza again became a
national concern in 1968. At that time, the EPO set up a flu surveillance unit that has
monitored flu cases every year since then.)
Despite this success, another tussle with influenza two decades later would cast a
shadow upon CDC’s reputation. The year 1976 merits a separate chapter in Etheridge’s
history because of events that showed the agency at its best but ironically contributed to
damaging it in the eyes of the public. For the CDC, America’s Bicentennial was a
momentous year. On the occasion of its 200th birthday, the country that had conquered
polio, walked on the moon, and had stood as a bulwark against tyranny had also just
recently retreated from Vietnam and found itself caught in the grip of economic hardship
that baffled its best minds and sapped its morale. Although America’s post-war
confidence waned generally, the CDC’s fortunes waxed. Confidence in its ability to deal
with population and community health problems at home and abroad had never been
higher than it was going into 1976, the year that marked CDC’s thirtieth anniversary.
David Sencer, MD, MPH, became CDC Director in 1966. Under his administration, the
CDC gained new responsibilities by adding functions from other areas of the USPHS and
grew in size by adding to its facilities. New buildings were erected on the Clifton Road
campus in Atlanta, Georgia, on land donated by Emory University next door and
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arranged by businessman-philanthropist Robert W. Woodruff (1889-1985). Woodruff,
who took the Coca-Cola Company from fledgling bottler to international corporate
giant,162 was Emory University’s largest benefactor and a close personal friend of
President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Woodruff started prodding his friend “Ike” who in turn
ordered the surgeon general to proceed with the planning and execution of the campus
design. The buildings were dedicated on September 8, 1960. CDC now had a permanent
“home.”163 The outlook for the agency was certainly bright. It had begun, as well, to
extend its influence abroad.
In 1966, Sencer committed CDC to the global smallpox eradication effort of the
World Health Organization (WHO).164 This continued the CDC on the path started by
Langmuir and the EIS in 1958. Until then, CDC was focused almost entirely on domestic
concerns. Fighting disease outbreaks in the states and territories at the start of the Cold
War had made Langmuir think about the possibilities of infectious diseases entering the
U.S. from abroad. One of the lessons from the Asian flu crisis of 1957 was that the world
had become more closely-connected following the Second World War. Rapid advances in
transportation and communication meant that there wasn’t a place on the globe that was
very far away from anywhere else. It had important implications for epidemiologists and
anyone else working to prevent the importation and spread of pathogens across borders.
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Drs. Stan Foster and Gene Gangarosa, EIS Chief Officer in 1964-65, described
CDC’s first efforts overseas in a special supplement article to the American Journal of
Epidemiology in this way:
A 1958 cable from the U.S. Embassy in East Pakistan captures the mundane
entrance of the CDC onto the international stage: “CDC offer accepted, want up
to 10 epidemiologists.”165
The East Pakistan166 scourge was smallpox. Led by Langmuir, the team of EIS officers
documented 14,000 cases of smallpox, found prior vaccination by Pakistani public health
officials to be effective, and identified non-vaccination as the principal risk factor. Foster
and Gangarosa are of the opinion that this seminal effort signaled the expansion of
CDC’s mission from a domestic to a global one. The experience had caused Langmuir to
be concerned about the possibility of smallpox importation into the U.S. He accordingly
parceled out smallpox-related assignments to EIS officers. In 1961, he told newlyappointed Chief EIS officer, J. Donald Millar, MD, to “Keep an eye on smallpox around
the world. See if you can make any sense of what’s happening.” This led to the creation
of a smallpox surveillance unit at CDC headed by Millar.167 When Sencer made the
decision to commit the CDC to smallpox eradication, the unit had been at work for five
years and was ready to provide background to the 50 CDC personnel assigned to the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded project starting in West Africa
in 1966. In this situation, the Chief EIS Officer had responsibility for moving officers,
both “field” and “house,” into the service rotation. “Field” officers were assigned to state
and municipal health departments while “house” officers were stationed at the CDC
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headquarters in Atlanta. The Field Services Division (FSD), created in 1965, was the
primary supervisor of field officers while house officers had supervisors in their own
units at CDC. The Chief reported directly to the EPO Director at CDC. When the need
arose for officers to combat special outbreaks either at home or abroad, the Chief then
went to the FSD and to the unit supervisors to pick the officers to respond. The Chief had
direct responsibility for creating the staff to investigate outbreaks that required either
more than the usual number of officers or required the immediate movement of officers
overseas. The Chief also counseled officers in the field when special problems emerged
as with a supervisor, family concerns, or anything else outside the usual parameters of an
investigation.
A noteworthy contribution to smallpox eradication came from Dr. William Foege,
a 1962 EIS class member and future CDC Director serving as a consultant to the
program. Familiar with Nigeria, Foege kept monthly track of smallpox by mapping its
progress throughout the eastern region of Nigeria during the January to May epidemic
season for both 1966 and 1967. He noticed that cases started to appear near the border
with the northern area of Nigeria where smallpox was endemic and spread south. This
surveillance activity made Foege ask himself if the first outbreaks were stopped, would
the entire epidemic cease. When smallpox struck a town with documented vaccination
coverage of greater than 90%, he hit upon the strategy of active surveillance, a search for
cases, and containment which “laid the foundation for global smallpox eradication.”168
Despite the success of the EIS at accomplishing seemingly impossible tasks such
as smallpox eradication with WHO, two domestic infectious diseases, one new, one all
168
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too familiar, were to vex the agency in the mid-1970s. The CDC under Sencer would
have a different and broader mission. It was to put activities dealing with primary
prevention “under one roof.”169 A reorganization of the U.S. Public Health Service saw
the CDC moved up to a level even with that of the NIH and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).170 Although some of its programs were cut, CDC acquired the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) along with a branch to
combat lead-based paint poisoning, the national quarantine program from Washington
DC, and the urban rodent control program. These added to CDC’s stature, though NIOSH
was a difficult fit. Its constituency, labor, was different from CDC’s which worked with
state health departments. The other two programs, lead paint and rat control, opened the
door to work with environmental health issues with which CDC was familiar. As well,
Sencer created a Bureau of Health Education.171 CDC seemed to be doing everything
right.
The Legionnaires’ Disease outbreak in Philadelphia at an American Legion
convention in August 1976 was a very public and highly contentious investigation.
Although the mystery of the illness’s origin and nature was solved by CDC, federal and
state health officials ultimately argued over who would receive credit and who would
receive blame for its outcome. Some in the media claimed that CDC ignored toxins in
favor of biological causes.172 In reality CDC did not favor any one investigative strategy
to the detriment of others. It was difficult, however, to refute charges of neglect with the
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media expecting quick action and suspecting laxness to be the reason why the
Legionnaires’ investigation remained stubbornly open. Congressman John Murphy
scheduled hearings to probe deeper into the accuracy of the charges. Despite pointing out
how difficult it can be to increase our medical and scientific knowledge, Murphy’s
conclusion was that CDC’s effort was “botched up.”173 Criticism was also leveled by
Pennsylvania’s secretary of public health, Dr. Leonard Bachman. He complained that the
disease had become a media event and that CDC had given “too much help” during the
Philadelphia outbreak.174 The CDC was under fire as never before.
The increased criticism came at a time when the nation’s health officials were
concerned, once again, with influenza. An outbreak at the U.S. Army training base at Fort
Dix, New Jersey was discovered to be swine flu. This was especially worrisome because
the 1918-19 pandemic that killed almost a half million Americans was thought, in 1976,
to have been swine flu. (In 2005, it is believed that avian, or “bird,” origin is just as
likely.) Health officials met to decide what to do. Despite the fear that a killer flu
inspires, there appeared to be time to develop a vaccine. The CDC made plans to act
because, as Etheridge describes it, “good preventive medicine demanded action.”175
There was not, however, agreement about what that action should be. Some advocated
stockpiling the vaccine in case it was needed. Others, including Sencer, thought it should
be developed and then used immediately. CDC’s recommendation would be to “make
grants to the states to purchase vaccines and immunize the [general] population at risk,
using the resources of both the public and private sector.” The country’s top political and
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health leaders decided to approve spending $135 million to develop a vaccine and
immunize the nation’s citizens.
The vaccine program, however, was plagued with problems from the start.
Because of adverse reactions from test subjects, the American Insurance Association
decided not to insure the vaccine manufacturers against liability, an ominous sign.176
Sencer intervened with the Secretary of HEW to cover any damage awards stemming
from the vaccination program. Without that guarantee, no vaccine would have been
produced.
After fits and starts, the vaccination program began on October 1. CDC had its
surveillance capability focused to detect any unusual occurrences that might be
associated with the vaccine. Six weeks into the program, the first cases of Guillain-Barré
syndrome (GBS)177 surfaced and “a red flag went up in surveillance.”178 After much
consultation with surveillance experts, including the now-retired Alex Langmuir, the
CDC was ready to say that GBS was not a problem for the program. CDC
epidemiologist, Dr. Lawrence Schonberger, however, was not entirely convinced. Rerunning the data that had been reported,179 he found a connection between the vaccine
and GBS. As a result, the program was stopped, “temporarily,” on December 16 and
never resumed. It was eventually determined by CDC that any cases of GBS occurring
within 6-8 weeks in people who had received the swine flu shots could be associated with
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the vaccination program and entitled to compensation.180 Although CDC’s
epidemiologists had tracked down the problem, the vaccination campaign was halted.
The failure of the CDC swine flu program affected the relationship of public health to
Congress and the general public for years to come.
The media which had praised CDC’s efforts in the ‘50s and ‘60s now became
openly skeptical of its findings. When Drs. Joseph McDade and Charles Shepard over the
Christmas holiday season discovered the bacterium that caused the Legionnaires’ disease,
it was a triumph for the CDC and its laboratories.181 Though the Legionnaires’
investigation must be ranked as an impressive achievement, the CDC could not counter
the negative publicity nor prevent the accompanying political fallout. The fact that the
CDC in five months of strenuous effort discovered a whole new family of bacteria,
Legionella pneumophilia, solved two previous outbreaks due to that bacteria in 1966 and
1968, and established new laboratory technical standards for uncovering similar
outbreaks was ignored by Washington political leaders.182 As Etheridge writes, the CDC
“had lost its innocence.” In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate the CDC, along with
nearly all government agencies, was to receive more scrutiny and less unquestioned trust.
Being scientific and to have had so many triumphs were not enough for it to be “above
suspicion” any longer.183 When the Carter administration took office in January 1977,
HEW Secretary Joseph Califano publicly fired Sencer. Someone had to pay for the swine
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flu fiasco and that person was the man whose skillful administration had made the CDC a
public health force both at home and abroad.
Bill Foege, chosen to succeed Sencer, found Secretary Califano a difficult person
to please. Foege spent a lot of time in Washington responding to Califano’s demands.
Things were different for CDC on Capitol Hill and Foege was unused to the political
infighting and the process of lobbying. Budget money was harder to come by and that
hurt existing programs. Thoughts turned to making do with less. When the Reagan
administration took office in 1981, it was clear that everything CDC did would have to be
fiscally justified and staunchly defended. Though not good at doing so, public health, in
general, needed to promote itself more than ever as it faced nationwide retrenchment.184
NIOSH also presented a problem to Foege that was perhaps a symbol of how much
change there had been in the society at large.
It became necessary to recognize that NIOSH’s pro-labor stance had affected its
science in at least one high-profile instance. The Institute’s report on beryllium exposure
and its threat to worker health was refuted by an expert panel.185 NIOSH, Foege
recognized, needed to be managed more closely. That meant a move to Atlanta. It would
not be an easy transition. As longtime CDC official William Watson put it when recalling
the Venereal Disease Division’s move from Washington to Atlanta, “When the surgeon
general made [that] decision, we were unhappy, just as the NIOSH people were unhappy,
but in effect, we saluted and went on and did it.” As Etheridge puts it, people were more
inclined in 1981 to resist the changes and to fight them through their union
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representatives.186 The nation as a whole had changed as a result of the social activism of
the 1960s and 1970s. Political differences hardened and the electorate became polarized.
When the AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome) virus was recognized in June
1981, the CDC was ill-prepared to stop its spread. The cultural and political climate was
not receptive to arguments that a disease affecting sub-cultures on the margins of society,
homosexuals and intravenous drug users, should receive the funding necessary to stop
it.187
By the time the major problems of 1976 and 1977 surfaced, Alex Langmuir had
retired. In 1970, he left the EIS to become Visiting Professor of Epidemiology at Harvard
Medical School. He had left behind an epidemiology program with a reputation for
efficiency and effectiveness. CDC’s “disease detectives” were, literally, world-famous.
Philip Brachman succeeded Langmuir at a time when Americans no longer reflected the
faith in government implicit in the “Great Society” programs of the Lyndon Johnson
years (1964-1969). With Sencer gone as well, it was harder to secure funding. People
now began to question if government not only “could” but “should” be providing security
to its citizens. Public health, a communal effort, would not escape scrutiny. The
culmination of increasing anti-government sentiment was the election of Ronald Reagan
in 1980. Budget cutting became the norm.188 The EIS classes were smaller and Chief’s
position was seen as wholly “administrative” and not worth an officer’s time that might
be better spent in the field.

186

Ibid.
In comparing AIDS victims to those of Legionnaires’ disease, Representative Henry Waxman (D-Calif.)
said, “What society judged was not the severity of the disease but the social acceptability of the individuals
affected with it.” Ibid. 329.
188
All health budgets were cut; those for prevention by 25 percent. Etheridge 319.
187

64
It is within this context that the EIS Chiefs operated both under the man who
created the role, Alexander Langmuir, and his successors in the Epidemiology Program
Office. Their impressions, as well as the course of their careers, reflect CDC internal
politics, the influence of Langmuir, effects of disease outbreaks both domestic and
foreign, and the social, political, and economic trends in the United States itself from
1951 to the present.
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Chapter 4: The Chiefs: 1951 - 1998
“ … I’d be glad to speak with you although I cannot imagine why anyone would
want to write a master’s thesis about the Chief of the EIS.”189 That e-mail message from a
former officer should have been daunting but familiarity with the EIS’s history and
knowledge of how the Chief’s role changed over the last 50 years had indicated that even
within the EIS, the Chief’s full effect was either unknown or underestimated. Anyone
skeptical about the importance of the Chief is likely to be so because the changes that can
be effected from the position are often subtle and usually dependent on the personality,
drive, and vision of the person occupying the office. This chapter will follow the
evolution of the position from its inception in 1951 through the late 1990s. The tenure of
the current chief (1998 – 2006) and the outlook for the future will be covered in the last
chapter. While the officers in training and in the field depended on the Chief’s
performance, the greatest effect of the position may have been on the dedicated and
skilled people who held it.
The narrative is chronological. It is sub-divided by the terms of the Directors of
Epidemiology at the CDC.190 The first period was that of Alexander D. Langmuir, M.D.,
encompassing the early days with all its excitement and uncertainty (1951 – 1970). The
second important period was the leadership of Philip Brachman, M.D. (1970 - 1983),
which was marked by the diminution of the Chief’s role and the trend away from
appointing experienced EIS officers to the position in an era of limited budgets as well as
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a change in the guiding philosophy. The next stage began with the appointment of Carl
Tyler, M.D. and the creation of “functional but unofficial Chiefs.” The final and current
stage under consideration commenced with the appointment of Stephen B. Thacker,
M.D., M.Sc., as head of the Epidemiology Program Office (EPO) in 1989.
Any history of the Chief EIS Officer must begin with the person who created the
role, Alex Langmuir. As he began to staff the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS),
Langmuir knew that the process of a disease outbreak investigation would be wholly
dependent on the quality of the investigator. He believed strongly in “shoe-leather”
epidemiology; the investigating officer must go to the site and ask questions and collect
data himself.191 For reasons of data integrity, it would not be enough to rely on others to
do so. In order to train people to the standard he desired and envisioned, he would need to
direct most of the budget to the incoming officers. To make the most of his small budget,
he would have to assemble a small but competent and well-motivated staff to manage it.
One of the positions he created was that of the EIS Chief Officer. The purpose of the
position was to assist the recruitment of good prospects, develop their investigation skill
through training and experience, and also to help maintain them in the field.192 In the
course of fulfilling the aforementioned duties, each of the chiefs dealt with one or two
different issues that dominated their tenures. The evolution of Chief’s role moved in step
with changes in the EIS itself.
The role of the Chief may be understood to have gone through a “life cycle”
similar to that of any organizational entity. In the beginning when Langmuir created the
position, everything was new. The Chief had to forge a relationship with the boss above
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and the officers in the Atlanta headquarters branches, and in the “field,” (state health
departments), who were at the same professional level. The role grew in importance as
the program grew. This meant that the Chief was there when important decisions were
made. A dozen years after its founding, however, Langmuir, pressed to satisfy two
talented protégés, separated the EPO into two branches, which changed the relationship
of the EIS Chief Officer to both Langmuir and the rest of the EIS. The Chief’s role
became more complex from that time on as the staff grew. Even as time went on,
however, the position was still effective, especially if one was an officer in the field. The
position itself was held by some of the more experienced people that had ever entered the
EIS. It was also, for a time, a purely administrative job with many of the professional
aspects, such as writing the EIS Bulletin, editing the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report (MMWR) etc. having been assumed by the Director of the Bureau of
Epidemiology (precursor to EPO). It also served as a marker for how the makeup of the
EIS classes was evolving.
As women joined the EIS in greater numbers in the 1980s,193 it was perhaps
inevitable that its first woman Chief would soon follow. Polly Marchbanks was a nonphysician R.N., Ph.D., M.P.H., who brought a perspective to the Chief’s role that
challenged the physicians’ rules about pay and recruitment. Her tenure marked the
advancement of the Ph.D. in the ranks of epidemiologists as EIS assignments at CDC
were increasingly in chronic disease branches. Her performance as chief also reflected
the personal qualities that were important to her success.
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She was followed in the job by a woman physician with a completely different
point of view on the very crucial issue of equal pay for equal work; the conflict around
that issue was reflective of a trend in the society at large except that it was about
professional standing and not about gender. This is just one example of how the Chiefs’
tenures could reflect what was happening in the broader society as well as in response to
changing program emphases.
If Langmuir shaped and guided the EIS as almost a kind of priesthood in its early
years, his hand-picked Chiefs, for the most part, worshipped at the same altar. Each of the
officers who had served under him had the greatest respect for Langmuir and commented
on how much that experience influenced their later careers, though not all of them
relished the job. When he retired in 1970, it marked a change in budgets and program
emphasis, the result of which was that some of the Chief’s responsibilities were assumed
by the Director of the Bureau of Epidemiology while others were assigned to clerical
staff. The Chief became a “coordinator.” Other changes occurred when Marchbanks took
the position in 1991 and started emphasizing the Ph.D.’s and their equality with the
physicians although some of the changes she advocated did not survive her departure.
Despite the skill and experience of the people occupying the role, there are
aspects of all organizations’ cultures that are resistant to change, even though all felt they
must try to keep the best while still working to improve the program. When asked what
he expected when he took the job in 1998, current Chief, Douglas Hamilton, M.D., Ph.D.,
said, “The program was well-established and was run by well-qualified people. I saw that
my job would be to keep things running. I recognized [however] that there is a certain

69
amount of inertia in any organization and it’s important to try to overcome that.”194 There
were officers who, while not designated “Chief,” could be considered “functional chiefs”
and who helped define the position as it is in 2006.195 The performance of capable field
station supervisors such as Tom Chin (EIS ’54) showed fledgling Chiefs how operatives
in the field might be managed. The position could also be a springboard into other areas
and more than one Chief described how the experience opened other doors for them in
the world of public health. The Chief’s role, as that of the EIS as a whole, was also
influenced by what went on in the wider political and social world.
When the doctor draft made physicians liable for military service, Langmuir, who
was always alert to opportunities, sought and received permission to offer EIS service as
an alternative. In this way, he was able to fill the available officer positions with quality
recruits. He was convinced that this was the training program’s lifeblood and so was
always scrupulous about the paperwork and procedures related to the officers’ Selective
Service status and charged his Chiefs with monitoring it.196 Langmuir also used the threat
of “germ warfare” to help grow both the EIS and the CDC. In a way that was
controversial for the time, and is still questioned in some quarters today, Langmuir took
advantage of the possibility for biological attack to grow the EIS by making it seem
likely. A case can be made, however, for justifying his actions though there is some
evidence to suggest that this damaged the cause of public health in lasting ways. Money
allocated to traditional public health functions such as local disease control, staff training,
and public education were redirected into biological warfare defense. The lack of money
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was reflected in the large number of public health positions at all levels that went
unfilled, thus reducing public health effectiveness.197 Almost no one would disagree,
however, that the system of surveillance, epidemiology training, and response
mechanisms he put in place would not likely have been established otherwise.
For the EIS, the 1950s were years of growth, development, and the struggle for
credibility. Its first class consisted of 23 officers: 22 physicians and one sanitary
engineer. For the CDC to provide meaningful and effective epidemiological aid to the
states, it needed to train “crackerjack” epidemiologists who could respond quickly to a
host of public health emergencies in peacetime as well as in war. The first training
program was for eight weeks and the instructors were faculty members from Langmuir’s
Johns Hopkins University days, consulting epidemiologists already at CDC, and the U.S.
Public Health Service (USPHS).198 The courses focused on epidemiology, bio-statistics,
and public health administration as applied to communicable disease control. The first
years of the program were structured to address infectious disease with assignments at
headquarters and in a few state and local health departments. As Langmuir intended, the
EIS offered physicians obligated to serve in the military an alternative to being drafted.199
In the process it allowed young doctors (they were mostly physicians at this time) to gain
first-hand knowledge of disease investigation and outbreak response while serving their
country in the hope that some of them would be inspired and intrigued enough by the
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experience to want to stay in public health.200 The most significant health events in which
the EIS participated during the 1950s were nationwide malaria control and polio
surveillance before and during the administration of the Salk vaccine (1955) and the
threat of Asian flu (1957-58).201 Among the Chief EISOs of the 1950s were Donald A.
(“D.A.”) Henderson, M.D., M.P.H.,202 (EIS ’55) later Dean of the School of Hygiene and
Public Health at Johns Hopkins University (1977-90) and Deputy Assistant Secretary and
Senior Science Advisor of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1993 95) and James O. Mason, M.D., Dr.PH., (EIS ’59) later Director of the CDC (1983-89)
and Assistant Secretary for U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services (1989-92).
In training, Langmuir emphasized the point that the “patient” was the community
and not an individual. The program would turn out “shoe leather” epidemiologists who
would conduct face-to-face interviews, trace suspect food or water to its origins, and
collect samples for laboratory analysis. The phrase became such a well-known expression
of how the EIS operated, that its symbol became the sole of a shoe with a worn hole in
the middle. Langmuir was a great believer in gathering one’s own data and “learning by
doing.” Stories were often repeated about officers “reading furiously about the putative
disease in question while in transit heading toward the epidemic.”203 Langmuir was
confident that bright energetic people properly motivated and supervised would be
resourceful enough to produce good results. Dr. Philip Brachman (EIS ’54), future head
of EPO, remembered being informed while attending a banquet that he would be going to
Louisiana to investigate what might be a human case of anthrax. “So I left the banquet,
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went to the library to read about anthrax, packed my bag, and took the next plane to New
Orleans.” 204 Langmuir also made sure that officers in the field would be properly
“mentored” and supported by the office in Atlanta. Thus the position of the Chief of the
EIS was in place to assist the work of officers in the field. The other duties included
recruiting, organizing the annual spring conference, selecting officers, selecting
supervisors, assisting in assignment selection, and structuring training under the guidance
of Langmuir while participating in field investigations themselves.205
The first chief of the EIS, Charles (“Mickey”) LeMaistre (EIS ’51), was witness
to this new type of epidemiology. Langmuir felt it was not enough to assess and then stop
an outbreak. “While solving the local problem, officers were encouraged to use the
investigation to address issues of disease causation that might have national implications.
Langmuir wanted the investigation report to conclude with recommendations for
prevention, to return with the ‘intelligence.’”206 In answering a request from the city
health department in Tuba City, Arizona, LeMaistre saw how being on the spot to collect
the data would allow the officers to see for themselves what local conditions led to the
outbreak.207 In this way, recommendations for prevention and control had the force of
authenticity. Finding that hepatitis had infected 397 of the 419 children who attended the
school, the two EIS officers investigated the school, the city, and a nearby Indian village.
The plumbing was found to be at fault and recommendations were made to correct the
problem. Instead of “wrapping it up” at that point, the officers made another
recommendation for improving community health. In the course of their inquiries they
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had observed the treatment of tuberculosis in the local hospital. This led to their
recommendation to the Chief for assistance in bolstering the effectiveness of the hospital
TB program. A group from the U.S. Public Health Service was assigned to the task of
improving the hospital’s treatment of tuberculosis. As LeMaistre observed, containment
was accomplished, the hepatitis patients recovered with “very few residuals [effects],”
and a “new format for health” was established within the Navajo tribe.208 LeMaistre was
officially the Assistant to the Chief, at the time Langmuir led the Epidemiology Office.
He was, however, the Chief Officer, almost a “first among equals.” It was clear that more
was expected out of the Chief.
The second Chief, Ira Myers (EIS ’51), was an Alabama native interning in a
Marine Hospital in Seattle, Washington when Alex Langmuir arrived during a recruiting
swing through the northwest. Langmuir made the proposed service sound exciting and
Myers applied. He recalled that one of his jobs as Chief was to deliver a presentation to
the Surgeon General’s Staff Conference in Washington, DC. After explaining the purpose
and activities of the EIS, Myers announced he would demonstrate what he meant by
“shoe leather” epidemiology. Taking off one of his shoes he said, “This shoe has been
used during my internship in the Marine Hospital and I’ve worn it through in the field.”
He then poked a finger through a hole in the sole of the shoe, which provoked no small
amount of mirth. “I thought the Conference was about to break up [laughing]!”209
Among the many challenges facing the Chiefs of the 1950s was the belief on the
part of many physicians that public health was a bad place to be. The political climate of
the 1950s made support of public health difficult. The prevailing view was that health
208
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depended on medical care. Preventive medicine was neglected.210 Langmuir hoped that
by exposing a lot of people (relatively) to public health, a number of them would be
inspired to stay. Among those must be counted Ira Myers who, for twenty years, was
state epidemiologist and health officer for Alabama before finishing his career in private
practice.211 As Chief, Myers had close contact with Langmuir and was able to observe
him. He drew inspiration from the way his boss worked. “Alex was one of those
individuals that was a delight because he wanted something spectacular to happen every
day!” The experience of being Chief and being in proximity to important people in public
health deeply impressed the younger man. “As I think back on it, to sit in a conference
room where Jonas Salk and Albert Sabin were sitting across from each other trying to
decide whose vaccine was going to be first, is something that stays with your memory
forever.”212
In the early years, public health was not where bright, young physicians wanted to
be. Upon joining the two-year EIS program, Brachman remembered a friend’s mother
lamenting the interval of “intellectual neglect” that might affect his career.213 Despite
such adverse beliefs, the program thrived. EIS Chief Jim Mason made a significant mark
as an investigator when he demonstrated the link between oysters and hepatitis A. The
results brought attention to the pollution by sewage of urban and rural water supplies.214
The EIS spring conference of 1955 broke up on the first day when the need from
the field was for epidemiologists to conduct surveillance of polio vaccine complications
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in the midst of the first national vaccination program. The incoming class would be
unique in EIS history as the class that received its first field experience before its training.
A member of that class, D.A. Henderson, Chief Officer in 1955, remembered that it was
August before the class re-assembled in Atlanta.215 Henderson, the only Chief to serve
twice (1955-1956 and 1960-1961), credits extracurricular activities, at Oberlin College in
Ohio, with developing the organizational management skills that he employed as Chief.
“I worked on the yearbook. It was a big deal at Oberlin…They even paid their editors! I
was editor in my junior year and learned to work with a lot of people, mobilizing staff. I
wrote a lot for the yearbook.” In his senior year, he started a local college radio station,
WOBE (today, 91.5 FM), which also gave him further experience managing a staff and
budgets.216 He was recruited into the EIS by Ira Myers as an alternative to military
service. Henderson had looked at the prospect of “a tedious two years in the Army giving
physicals” and jumped at the chance to join the EIS. He sought the job of Assistant Chief
though warned against it by the previous assistant, Heinz Eichenwald (EIS ’53). The
combination of “medicine and management” appealed to Henderson who applied for the
position and secured it. He described Langmuir as a “fantastic teacher” noting that all the
officer-trainees were “totally absorbed” by his lectures.217
While most of that year’s class was away dealing with polio surveillance as a
result of the Cutter Vaccine Laboratories Incident,218 Henderson did his share of outbreak
investigations. Returning from a diphtheria investigation in Alabama, he discovered
Myers packing his bags. Assuming the position of Administrative Officer in the Alabama
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Health Department, Myers was leaving and now he, Henderson, was to be Chief. Myers
told a protesting Henderson, who claimed he didn’t know the nuances of the job, “That’s
OK; you’ll figure it out.”219
Henderson, indeed, “figured it out.” He found working with Langmuir exciting.
He performed the usual duties of organizing the spring conference in 1956, performed
recruiting and screening of candidates, and learned a lot about surveillance from
Langmuir. The post-EIS program appealed to Henderson as it did to others. The salary
was “good money” for the time at $6,000 to $7,000 a year. Signing up for three years
after the two-year EIS course meant that officers were one-fourth the way toward
performing 20 years’ service in the USPHS, the minimum for retirement.
He recalled the summer of 1957 as the time that Langmuir decided to take a
summer vacation, which he had denied himself since coming to CDC in 1949. Recalling
Langmuir’s view that bright people would learn very quickly to handle unfamiliar
situations, Henderson was left to deal with some problems on his own. “Alex’s standard
bet was a bottle of whiskey. If I needed to call him [during Langmuir’s vacation], I would
have to buy him a bottle. If I made it through the summer without calling him, he would
buy me the bottle. I won the bottle that year.”220
During his second tenure as Chief (1960-1961), Henderson noted that officer
retention rates improved by giving them overseas assignments. At a time when most
officers were leaving to enter academe, sending them on overseas assignments seemed to
pique many officers’ interests causing them to stay in public health. “The experience of
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seeing how other countries funded and managed their public health efforts made officers
want to compare it to the U.S. method.”221
A lifelong interest in surveillance was stimulated by seeing statistician Bob
Serfling’s tracking of the 1957 Asian influenza outbreak. “He found about 75,000 excess
deaths that year by plotting the “epi” curve of deaths and showing how the outbreak of
flu could be observed.” During a single-officer epidemic assistance investigation, referred
to as “Epi-Aid,” of botulinum toxin in Argentina in the late 1950s, Henderson was first
exposed to an outbreak of smallpox. The Argentine health minister granted Henderson’s
request to fly to the north of the country where an outbreak was taking place. Henderson
was later involved in managing the American share of the global effort to eradicate
smallpox. His tenure as Chief sharpened his administrative skills and helped him to
achieve such a far-reaching public health effect.
Another EIS Chief, H. Bruce Dull, M.D., S.M.Hyg., (EIS ’57) was there when the
CDC took its first major steps into the field of international Epi-Aid in response to a
request from USAID in 1958 to investigate smallpox and cholera in West Pakistan. Dull
recalled learning something very important that colored his view of field work and his
own role in teaching and assigning officers as Chief. While making rounds in a hospital
to check on reporting of smallpox cases, Dull was struck by an encounter with the local
physician in charge. In explaining his agitation to the EIS epidemiologists, he said, “You
may notice that I’m hostile … the reason I am, is not that you are here helping us because
we obviously need your help, but that we have to ask for it.” The memory of that
physician’s anger and embarrassment at his country’s failure would remind Dull that the
pride as well as the skills of local health officials needed to be respected anytime EIS
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officers performed outbreak investigations.222 Dull would also be Assistant Chief during
the 1957 Asian influenza outbreak and would participate in field vaccine trials conducted
at the federal penitentiary in Atlanta on which he reported to the EIS community at large
through the EIS Bulletin, which was his responsibility as Chief to edit.223 He described
the study as “the most contributory of all that were done” as it proved the vaccine 80% to
90% successful in the first round and only slightly less so in the second.224
In addition to the duties mentioned above, the Chiefs edited the EIS newsletter,
The EIS Bulletin. This publication was distributed to the EIS officers, staff, and
alumni.225 The 1950s issues were written in the style of a memorandum (“To: ...” “From:
…” “Subject: …”) and, in fact, billed itself as such. “A monthly information
memorandum prepared primarily for the E.I.S. officers.”
The Bulletins contained more information that was written in a style livelier than
would have been expected of people with so many other responsibilities as the EIS Chief.
There were officer-contributed book reviews; a listing of manuscripts cleared for
publication; notices of lectures & presentations; comments on the monthly reports, their
progress, and quality (“Monthly reports are coming in on time and they are, by and large,
excellent…”);226 feature articles (“An EIS Batting Average” about the number of officers
electing to stay in public health);227 and a listing of the Epidemic-Aid calls since the last
Bulletin. The brief outbreak investigation notices included the situation “Diarrhea of the
Newborn,” the location “Jewell, Iowa” and the date, “September 6, 1955.” The notice
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listed the investigation team members and their professional specialties, “Dr. Fred Payne;
Engineer” and a reference to the date of the Aid Memo, “October 17, 1955,” from which
the information was excerpted.228 There were articles intended to reinforce training and to
keep officers abreast of new scientific developments as in “How Long Will it Take to do
How Much?” offering an approximation of the time needed to perform such things as
taking blood samples (“14.1 per hour.”)229
A reading of the Bulletins seems to confirm the idea that the Chief needed to be
on top of nearly everything that almost everyone in the EIS was doing.230 This extended
to alumni as well as currently serving officers. When the first EIS Chief, Charles
LeMaistre, had a building at the M.C. Anderson Cancer Center at the University of Texas
named after him in 1997, the news appeared in the Bulletin.231 The Bulletin also ran its
share of humorous articles from D.A. Henderson’s “Administrative Definitions” such as:
“FURTHER SUBSTANTIATION DATA NECESSARY” Translation: “We’ve lost your
stuff; send it again,”232 in a “send-up” of typical bureaucratic language through the
pictorial spread on the “kidnapping” and eventual “’round-the-world” travels of Doug
Hamilton’s “Gumby” plastic figure, affectionately mocking the sudden international
assignment that could be the lot of each officer.233 There was also a “Positions Available”
column in each issue. As the EIS grew and the recognition that epidemiology was
important grew with it, the number of “job ads” increased for positions both in the states
and in academe. The EIS Bulletin reflected the fact that the Chiefs were very close to all
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the action in the 1950s as the EIS and the CDC established their credibility. The changes
in the EIS and the Chief’s role can also be observed in the pages of the Bulletin.234
The EIS of the 1960s has been referred to as a place where many of the very “best
and brightest” in twentieth century public health began their careers.235 The Sixties is
remembered principally for the Vietnam War that ultimately divided the nation. Before
that, however, it was a time when young people, inspired by a young president, John F.
Kennedy, became imbued with a spirit of service to their nation. The Peace Corps was
born out of the typically American desire to spread prosperity, confer education, and
alleviate sickness236 in the “Third World.” At the time, physicians were subject to
mandatory service through the military draft (Selective Service). The decision by some to
opt for training in field epidemiology in the EIS instead of battlefield medicine resulted in
a positive effect on public health both home and abroad. These officers, most just out of
residency programs, would find their orientation changed decisively from the “single,
sick patient to the well-being of communities worldwide.”237 The first Chief of the
decade was Don Millar (EIS ’61). During his tenure the nature of the role, which was
seen by some to be that of Langmuir’s “valet,”238 started to change.
Echoing the sentiment of almost all the interviewed officers, J. Donald Millar,
M.D., D.T.P.H., said about his experience, “I considered it an incredible blessing to be
with EIS. If I had sat down and drafted anything by way of a career, it would not have
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been as interesting and fulfilling as what I got at CDC.”239 He had come to the EIS almost
as an afterthought. It was a former EIS officer, Luther Giddings, (EIS ’56) who asked
Millar to consider joining the elite epidemiology program in the spring of 1961,
seemingly too late for that year’s class. He had been considering which service to enter
after he received his notice to report for a pre-induction physical while interning in
obstetrics at the University of Utah. Taking Giddings’s advice to call Langmuir, Millar
was able to speak directly to him. Langmuir said that Millar was in luck as someone had
just withdrawn from the program the day before so there was an opening and could he,
Millar, fly to Atlanta the next day. He was not able to do so but convinced Langmuir to
query references at Utah, which he did to his evident satisfaction and Millar was
accepted.
Unlike most of the Chiefs, Millar actively sought the job. In his match interview,
Millar needed to pick a headquarters assignment (Atlanta) and a state assignment. (He
chose Kansas.) The job he really wanted was Assistant Chief. “I actively sought the
position. At the [annual] picnic, I told people I wanted it.”240 Having lobbied
successfully, Millar got the assignment as Assistant Chief to D.A. Henderson, in his
second stint as Chief, in the first year and as Chief the second.
Langmuir had written a position description that outlined all the responsibilities
but left the procedures up to the Chiefs themselves. This was consistent with Langmuir’s
belief that bright and energetic people needed little direction and could be relied upon to
exhibit resourcefulness appropriate to the situation.241 Anything else they could figure out
for themselves. Recruiting was a very important part of the job and, according to Millar,
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was handled carefully. The inflow of officers into the program at this time was dependent
on its being an alternative to the military draft. Langmuir was scrupulous in following the
guidelines laid down by the Selective Service law. Langmuir wanted the Chief to see to it
that no officer was stationed anywhere near his draft board. Millar said that the purpose
was to clearly show that EIS service was an assignment, not just a way to avoid the draft
and stay close to home. “[Langmuir] was concerned that any perception of program abuse
would jeopardize the entire program.”242 Langmuir was also focused on recruiting the
best and brightest prospects available. In addition to relying on personal
recommendations, Langmuir had an associate in Washington, D.C. who would scour the
rosters of USPHS hospitals for likely prospects and forward the information to Atlanta.
The Chief, at this point, would follow up by contacting the prospect. One of those
recruited and selected by Millar was a young physician working in one of those hospitals
on Staten Island, N.Y. named Bill Foege. After serving as a field officer in Colorado,
Foege (EIS ’62) went on to be pivotal in the smallpox eradication effort, first as an
officer in the field, then program director for West Africa, and ultimately became CDC
Director (1977-83).243
For Millar, there were the usual duties for a Chief: coordinating the training
program for new officers and organizing the spring conference. The EIS formed a
“wives’ club” to assist in those ways and, according to Millar, took pride in their
involvement, lending a “family” feeling to the program. “My wife [Joan] handled the
catering for events,” Millar said.
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The Chief’s role was defined by Langmuir to provide great operational flexibility.
As a result, Millar recalled, the Chief was to do “whatever Alex wanted done.” For
Millar, one of those tasks was representing the CDC EPO at the semi-annual meeting of
the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE). For the young Chief, it was
a chance to meet important people in state public health. He also managed to pick up
information that proved useful to officers in the field. Millar, for example, knew to tell
anyone assigned to work in a specific western state health department that it was
necessary to obtain all important and timely decisions from the head of epidemiology
before lunch, as a drinking problem rendered him ineffective after that time of the day.244
That flexibility extended to the outbreak investigations the Chief was required to
perform. Millar remembered going to London in 1961 for a smallpox outbreak of some
50 cases with the index case having arrived from Pakistan. This brought him into contact
with such luminaries as A.W. Downey, at the time considered the world’s leading pox
virologist, and Dr. George McDonald of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine. This last encounter inspired Millar to enroll at the school.245 Another result of
that assignment was Langmuir’s telling him, “Keep on eye on smallpox around the
world. See if you can make any sense of what’s happening.”246 When CDC made the
commitment to the smallpox eradication program in 1966, Millar was able to contribute a
great store of knowledge about the disease to the CDC/WHO team. “I had come back
from that [London outbreak investigation] trip as an expert on smallpox.”
Musing on other ways that being Chief was an asset to him professionally, Millar
mentioned being the EPO liaison to the American Epidemiology Society where he gave
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presentations. Working closely with Langmuir, he was able to interact with people in
public health at Langmuir’s level, which he considered invaluable experience in how
public health operated in the U.S. He remembered that for all his toughness and drive,
Langmuir was very personable, and very “human.” “For example, he kept candy bars in
one of his top desk drawers,” Millar said. “Whenever Joan would show up with our son,
Alex would give Stuart a candy bar and sit him on his knee and make a fuss over him.
Alex had lost one of his own [five] children. She was 8 or 9 years old and [had been]
mentally retarded. It was because of some kind of accident.”247 Frankly admiring of
Langmuir, Millar thought him a brilliant and impressive figure. “Alex had an almost
clairvoyant skill in academic epidemiology. It intrigued me that he could look at the
development of an epidemic and predict the size. He used stochastic processes;248 he had
learned calculus using slide rules.”
During his time as Chief, Millar and the EIS were confronted with two major
issues: What would be the EIS role in international health and how should the program
approach non-infectious diseases? The answers were to participate internationally using
the relationship of the states as a guide and allowing requests to come through USAID
and other federal agencies willing to fund them. The commitment to smallpox eradication
starting in 1966 helped to establish policies and procedures for international involvement.
It was also decided at CDC that non-communicable diseases were to become part of the
surveillance and response process. Langmuir himself felt especially committed to work
on family planning.249 By 1967, a group of non-governmental experts in the family
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planning field concluded that the 8 EIS officers assigned to evaluate that aspect of public
health constituted the largest number of professionals working in that area within the
USPHS.250 There were also the usual battles over politically-charged funding. Millar
recalled that Langmuir was very attentive to the problem of funding the program and its
officers. It was at these times that Millar found Langmuir to be most resilient. “To all the
difficulties we encountered, Alex’s response was, ‘Well, we’ll pick up the pieces in the
morning.’ It was his favorite phrase.”251
In assessing the value of the Chief’s position to public health, Millar thought that
the EIS was the best program of its size in the history of U.S. public health. Because of
the Chief’s pivotal role in the internal workings of the EIS, Millar said that “you cannot
talk about the EIS in the absence of this position.” As he made plain in his recounting, the
role had a significant effect on Millar’s own considerable public health career.252 The role
of the EIS Chief underwent a change, however, that portended its eclipse during the
1970s.
In 1963, Alexander Langmuir created two branches within the EPO: Investigation
Branch under Philip Brachman (EIS ’54) and Surveillance Branch under D. A.
Henderson (EIS ’55).253 As a result of turning over these aspects of the program to his
protégés, Langmuir distanced himself somewhat from the officers in the field.254 As this
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change occurred, the role of the Chief became even more important to the officers out on
assignments. Langmuir’s choice in 1964 of Eugene J. Gangarosa, M.S., M.D., (EIS ‘64)
reflected that concern.
Gene Gangarosa’s career in public health is that of a “builder of institutions.”
Knowing that they are only as good as the talent working in them, his role as EIS Chief
would be marked by the search for the best people available to staff the EIS. A veteran of
World War II, he was involved with the post-war occupation of Italy. It was there that he
saw the effects of a devastated public health infrastructure. As the German Army
retreated up the Italian Peninsula, it destroyed the roads, bridges, gas and electric lines,
and disrupted food and water supplies in order to slow the Allied advance. The city of
Naples, where Gangarosa was stationed, was especially hard hit. He saw firsthand what
diseases a contaminated public water supply could inflict upon a population. The cause of
clean water as a deterrent to diarrheal diseases became his special interest. After the war,
he entered the University of Rochester through the G.I. Bill for undergraduate work and
stayed to earn his M.D. in 1954. “To be successful as the EIS Chief,” he said, “having
management experience is key.”255 Along with the creation of the two branches, the
emphasis upon management experience in his Chiefs seemed to mark a decisive shift in
Langmuir’s thinking. His choices for that role made it apparent that the Chief would now
need to have experience coming into the program, and not just acquire it on the job, as
the classes were larger and the responsibilities included overseas response. Gangarosa,
therefore, would seem an excellent selection. His background was in academe and he
came to the EIS with international experience.
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Upon completion of his residency at Tripler Army Hospital in Hawaii and his
residency at Walter Reed Army Hospital, Gangarosa became Assistant Professor of
Medicine & Microbiology at the University of Maryland. While involved with a U. Md.
program in Pakistan and Thailand studying cholera, he considered applying to the EIS.
Contacting a former classmate, D.A. Henderson, then head of surveillance and a former
EIS Chief himself, Gangarosa was interviewed by Alex Langmuir who liked him and
made him EIS Chief for a year. Langmuir’s instructions were to support officers in the
field. In addition to that, he was heavily involved in recruiting. It was here that he showed
the ability to pick subordinates and create a functioning staff, a skill that served him well
when he later became Dean of American University in Beirut, Lebanon (1978-81), then
Director of the master’s degree program in public health at Emory University’s
Department of Community Health (1990-91), and as Director of the International Health
Track at the Emory School of Public Health (1991-92).256 Eager to work in the functional
branches of CDC on water-borne disease problems, Gangarosa, however, left his mark on
the EIS. As a talent spotter, he was exceptional. His recruits and selections included the
future EIS Chiefs J. Lyle Conrad (EIS ’65), later head of State Branch for 27 years;
Michael Gregg (EIS ’66), with whom he worked in Pakistan, was for 21 years the editor
of Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report; Bernard Challenor (EIS ’65), the first African
American EIS Officer; Ralph Henderson (EIS ’65), principal in malaria and
immunization programs at CDC as well as smallpox eradication; and Alan Hinman (EIS
’65), principal in the smallpox eradication campaign.257 Langmuir reluctantly let him go.
EIS’s loss was the CDC Enteric Disease Branch’s gain. Later, while Dean of American
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University in Beirut, Gangarosa continued to “talent-spot” for the CDC.258 Notable
recruits of that time are former EIS officers and current CDC staff Dr. Hani Atrash,
Director of Program Development for the National Center on Birth Defects and
Developmental Disabilities; Dr. Muin Khoury, Director of the Office of Genomics and
Disease Prevention; and Dr. Rima Khabbaz, Director of the National Center for
Infectious Diseases.259 A tireless and energetic advocate for prevention of enteric
diseases, Dr. Gangarosa and his wife, Rose, are currently administrating a non-profit
foundation the purpose of which is to promote “point-of-use” clean water devices in
countries lacking clean water distribution. On the occasion of his retirement from the
CDC in 1977, the EIS house publication printed the text of the citation he received when
was awarded the CDC Medal of Excellence shortly before. Among the many
achievements and contributions noted, including his role as a teacher, was his work
furthering the “surveillance and investigative capabilities for enteric diseases” and his
insistence upon “epidemiologic relevancy … in the prevention of human disease.”260
Gangarosa is an exemplar of the dedicated and skilled officers who assumed the Chief’s
role since 1951.
The next Chief was one of those young officers recruited by Gangarosa. Lyle
Conrad (EIS ‘65) came to the program better prepared than most for the role into which
he would be drafted. In 1964, Alex Langmuir made a lecture and recruiting trip to his
alma mater, Harvard University. While there he met Conrad, a former Peace Corps
physician in Nigeria where he was in charge of preventive and curative medicine for 500
Peace Corps volunteers, and current student in epidemiology at the School of Public
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Health. Conrad was inspired to apply to EIS and was eventually assigned to be Assistant
Chief at the conclusion of the match program for his incoming EIS class in 1965.261
Conrad approached the job with an understanding of what it was to be assigned far from
home after the sheltered and strictly regulated world of medical training. Having
management experience while in the Peace Corps was undoubtedly attractive to
Langmuir.262 By the 1960s, Langmuir had decided who would be an ideal candidate. In
describing Langmuir’s strategy for recruiting, Conrad said, “He wanted physicians with
two years in general medicine or pediatrics. He didn’t want people who were ‘board
certified’ because, he believed, they would not be likely to stay in public health as their
minds were made up before coming into the EIS. Langmuir did not want surgeons. He
also didn’t want those who held the Master’s in Public Health (MPH) degree because the
schools of public health did not teach field epidemiology and that was what the EIS did.
He also sought laboratorians, statisticians, engineers, and nurses, but few of them
joined.”263 Conrad discovered that Tom Chin (EIS ’54), a very capable outbreak
investigation officer, was an important supervisor in the EIS along with D.A. Henderson,
who ran Surveillance Branch, and Philip Brachman, Chief of the Investigation Branch.
Chin had responsibility for the Puerto Rico; Anchorage, Alaska; and Phoenix, Arizona
field stations as well as the Kansas City station where he was based. His careful
supervision and support of his officers in the field served as a model for Conrad and later
supervisors charged with managing EIS officers located in states during investigations.264
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At the time Conrad was Chief, the EIS classes had been approximately 30-35
officers in size. Approximately one-third of the officers were assigned to places outside
Atlanta, and two-thirds to the headquarters. Once they had been assigned and started to
go on outbreak investigations, the potential for conflict with supervisors in the states or
the CDC branches was greatest. It was then that the role of the EIS Chief was most
important. Langmuir wanted each officer on an outbreak investigation to have someone
in Atlanta to “talk them through” the investigation if necessary. Sometimes this would be
the disease-specific senior officer while at other times it fell to the Chief EISO,
depending upon who was available.265 Being able to manage the problems was crucial to
making the officers’ two-year experience a success.
It is worth noting that at this time the EIS was not as well-known or as popular as
it is today. Recruitment was still dependent on the specter of the military draft. Langmuir
had hoped that the two-year experience would persuade at least some of the EIS officers
to make public health their career. The fair and quick resolution of conflicts was
important to this process. According to Conrad, some of the problems included assigning
one officer to an outbreak when maybe three wanted to go. Another issue was who would
be the first author on a paper resulting from an investigation and the determination as to
whose investigation it was. There might be conflicts with state or local health officers
that would require the diplomatic skill of the Chief to satisfactorily resolve. For many of
the officers, the EIS was their first professional job. They would need to be advised as to
how to comport themselves when interacting with peers and superiors. They needed to
fully understand the relationship of their federal agency with their state counterparts. The
Atlanta supervisor was the headquarters person most likely to facilitate that process as
265
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well as intervene when conflicts arose.266 Langmuir, by this time, was more remote from
the officers as Millar suggested was true after the creation of the Investigation and
Surveillance branches. By February 1966, 20 additional positions for state-based officers
supported by measles control funding necessitated a second round of recruiting more
officers both before and after the April EIS conference. This then led to the establishment
of the Field Services Division with Lyle Conrad as one of its founders. This was
consistent with Langmuir’s view that the state experience mattered a great deal to the
program, the individual officers, and epidemiology as practiced in the states.
In his second EIS year, Conrad became Deputy Chief, Field Services Division and
learned even more about the problems of recruiting quality officers in large enough
numbers. Although it was not yet reflected in the makeup of the classes, Conrad asserts
that Langmuir wanted more women and minorities in the EIS. Indeed, he saw the
importance of having officers from all backgrounds. The accomplishment of that end
was, however, not easy. In the mid-sixties, it was very difficult to get African Americans
to relocate to the Atlanta area, which still featured elements of its segregationist past. The
’65 class had the first African American officer.267 The first Native American officer did
not join until 1978.268 Making visits to medical schools at that time was somewhat
haphazard, being dependent on available money and time. The Chief had to rely
principally on an EIS alumnus’s or alumna’s reference. Some efforts did not prove
successful but had to be done. In his first year, Conrad “went to the American Public
Health Association conference and I would man the CDC desk/booth for 5-6 days. … My
266

Ibid.
Ibid. At schools such as Howard University Medical School, prospects asked for guarantees that they
would not be assigned to the South. Given the nature of EIS response to outbreaks, this could not, of
course, be given.
268
Ibid. Jeral L. Ahtone, M.D.
267

92
second year, I was asked to do it again. It did not stimulate interest in the EIS.”269
Langmuir, nonetheless, insisted that medical professionals should be directly involved in
recruiting other medical professionals.270 Conrad provided a glimpse into the
administrative demands of this activity. “We got about 120 letters a year. Of those, about
60 might be truly interested in the EIS. ... While interviewing at their expense in Atlanta,
they had to be seen by at least one senior officer. Langmuir had developed a rating
system for them. He reviewed all applications and wanted to see by whom they were
recommended.” Retention of officers following their two-year service was also a
persistent problem. Up to the early 1970s, the vast majority of officers left the CDC after
their tour of duty finished, the lure of academe and private practice being the chief
reasons. The recruitment and retention issues would change as the reputation of the EIS
grew.
As with all EIS Chiefs, Conrad was also assigned to outbreak investigations and
to do anything else Langmuir needed done. One such assignment, having to do with
immunization training, turned out to be a very interesting and unexpected experience.
In the fall of 1965, some Peace Corps volunteers needed to be trained in immunization
techniques for upcoming two-year assignments to India. It was decided by the Peace
Corps to have them learn by immunizing the population of Leslie County in eastern
Kentucky against measles.271 Langmuir assigned this project and attached visiting fellow
S.K Sengupta, an Indian civil servant and staff physician from their surveillance and
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epidemiology unit in New Delhi, to Conrad for this mission. Sengupta would provide the
volunteers with information about what they might face in India. Upon arrival in Leslie
County, Conrad and Sengupta discovered that the Frontier Nursing Service (FNS), a
British mission effort to the U.S., was providing health care to this remote area. The FNS
presence consisted of a single doctor to deal with emergencies for the 20,000 people in
Leslie and Clay Counties and nurse practitioners running a series of 20 or so clinics. In
addition to providing an important experience for the Peace Corps volunteers, the
successful immunization effort done largely through the FNS series of clinics proved that
measles could be controlled and even eradicated if the will to do so were present. A full
90% of the county’s children were reached.272 Other training duties included setting up
the space to hold the first “Tuesday Morning Seminars” featuring reports from officers
returning from outbreak investigations.273 At this time, Langmuir also created an EIS
graduation certificate for all alumni to post on their office walls. It came out in April
1966.274
Langmuir’s concern about measles led to a new development in EIS during the
summer of 1966 that would change Conrad’s career path at the CDC. Alex Langmuir’s
concern for the control of airborne diseases such as measles led to the proposal for a
branch of the EPO to be established in partnership with Dr. Robert Freckleton of the
CDC’s Immunization Program. Langmuir and Freckleton thought that the time was right
to decisively control measles in the United States.275 Approximately one-half million

272

Ibid. Measles disappeared from the counties for a few years but returned as the vaccinations were not
continued. Measles was not banished until the state participated in the measles control program of the
1970s.
273
The seminars are still held every Tuesday at CDC as of March 1, 2006.
274
Conrad, Interview with the author, 2 May 2005.
275
Etheridge 168-170.

94
cases were reported each year with around 500 child fatalities276. In order to make sure
that any vaccination campaign was successful, more epidemiologists would be needed at
the state level.277 John Witte (EIS ’63), a pediatrician, asked Conrad if he were interested
in joining him in setting up a State Services Branch in EPO. The purpose would be to use
immunization money to support the addition of perhaps 20 EIS officers to be stationed in
the states to assist with measles outbreak control with the further happy result of them
being in place for whatever else needed epidemiological response. Conrad, who believed
in epidemiological practice centered in the states, was delighted with the idea.
The role of Chief EISO, subordinate as it was to Langmuir’s vision, became less
appealing for someone wishing to make his own way in epidemiology. Langmuir thanked
him for his year as Chief and gave his blessing to “State Branch” as it was consistent with
Langmuir’s own belief in the need to work at the “ground level” in public health. So it
was that Conrad’s experience as Chief contributed to the formation and direction of the
State Branch which thrives, still, within the EIS. That the care and supervision of officers
in the field was vital to their effectiveness and retention was illustrated some thirty years
later upon the occasion of Conrad’s retirement from his position as Director of Field
Epidemiology. He received heartfelt tributes during that year’s EIS Conference for his
contributions to epidemiology, CDC and the EIS. Philip Landrigan (EIS ’70)
remembered the avuncular Conrad as a mentor and friend; always a source of support.278
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Today, almost half of the state epidemiologists are former EIS officers, many
having started out in State Branch.279 As Conrad recalled, “the year 1966 marked the start
of the EIS drive to support the state health departments in a serious and sustained fashion.
Today, forty or more officers are on duty in state and local health departments, improving
our nation’s disease surveillance capacity enormously.”280
Lyle Conrad’s successor as Chief, Mike Gregg, (EIS ’66) came to the job with a
different background and was faced with greater challenges, ironically, because of the
success of his predecessors. Michael Gregg, M.D., was an Assistant Professor of
International Medicine at the University of Maryland in the fall of 1965 and none too
happy about it. He was somewhat disenchanted by the competitive pressure, lack of
laboratory facilities, and much less support than he believed was necessary to perform
well in the position. He had worked alongside Gene Gangarosa in West Pakistan for two
years and knew Bruce Dull. Dull asked him to consider the EIS and so Gregg wrote a
letter to Alexander Langmuir inquiring about admission to the epidemiology training
program. Langmuir responded by offering Gregg the job as EIS Chief starting in July
1966.
Nineteen sixty-six was a momentous year for both the EIS and CDC as a whole.
The new CDC Director, David Sencer, followed the recommendations of Alex Langmuir
of Epidemiology and Bob Freckleton of Immunization in putting CDC’s nowconsiderable weight behind a national program to eradicate measles. The funding was
available due to renewal of the Vaccination Assistance Act of 1965. In the previous two
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years, almost 1,000 children died from measles. That death toll was thought to be
unconscionable at a time when the means to eradicate measles was available.281
Langmuir and Freckleton joined forces and with Sencer’s political acumen proceeded to
place more EIS officers in state health departments than ever before. The positions of 20
new officers in both 1966 and 1967 specifically allocated for state service increased the
Chief’s workload in officer recruitment, selection, and assignment as the EIS doubled to
70 officers per year. Management in the field would come from the new Field Services
Division (FSD).282
It is here that the Chief’s role changed again, in a way that an outside observer
might miss. Gregg was technically not an EIS officer in that he did not go through the
“match” program or the summer training. He was also not in the rotation for field
assignments. Langmuir designated him Chief and wanted him to concentrate on
alleviating the EPO administrative workload.283 In discharging his duties, Mike Gregg
saw advantages in working under Langmuir. He expected that he would learn from
someone who had mastered the administrative aspects of running a well-regarded
teaching program. This would include creating courses; organizing and publicizing
conferences; and recruiting, interviewing, and selecting people. It was good training in
administration for the Chief, but the opportunity was available in some measure because
of Langmuir’s reluctance to perform certain tasks.284 He wanted, for example, a Chief
upon whose judgment he could rely when it came to interviewing people. As Gregg put
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it, “He didn’t want to interview everyone. He wanted me to screen the candidates for
‘good ones.’”285
The increase in officers saw Gregg going out to the field frequently. The need was
for better scientific and medical support for the officers in the states even given the
support from the FSD. “Either the state epidemiologist was too busy or not
knowledgeable enough, particularly in the area of statistics,” said Gregg. “Some states
had only minimal staff. In those days, the state epidemiologist was not a particularly
important position. The position of ‘health officer’ was more important.”286 His and
others’ assistance to the officers was not all scientific. The relationship between the
officer and the state supervisor was very important. They should communicate well. In
order to assess the situation and to make any adjustments, Gregg’s technique was to first
casually visit with the state supervisor to establish a comfortable relationship. Next, he
would visit the officer to hear what he had to say. Finally, he would return to the
supervisor to discuss what he had heard. “I wanted to be sure the officer had a good
mentor.”
In July 1966, the State Branch, with Witte and Conrad, was able to provide advice
and consultation assistance to the officers stationed in the field but Gregg was on his own
to look out for officers from Atlanta who were sent out on investigations. Langmuir
wanted the Chief to make sure officers stationed in the field and in the Atlanta
headquarters were busy and learning epidemiology. With the extraordinarily large class
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in 1966, the Chief was kept very busy, though not with participation in investigations.
The position, at this point, was becoming more administrative than “hands-on.” Gregg
noted that Langmuir was becoming more remote. Langmuir’s secretary adopted a
protective stance and tended to shield him from the outside, although he always took time
to visit with officers.287
After two years in the Chief EISO job, Gregg moved on to be the editor of the
MMWR (Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report). He credits his time as Chief with
helping him in his work as editor. The varied experiences of the officers he managed
gave him a deeper appreciation of substantive articles and his ability to judge their worth.
About the effect of being Chief, he said, “It was good in that I was exposed to a variety of
assignments … I knew what to expect from EIS officers when asking them to write an
article. The exposure helped me to appreciate what should or should not go into the
articles.” He got the editor’s position through a bit of serendipity. To show what he was
doing as Chief, Gregg wrote an article and sent it to Langmuir just at the time that he was
looking for an editor. “Alex wrote back, ‘Mike: I didn’t know you could write! How
would you like to be editor of MMWR?’ He applied gentle pressure. He was always
fair.”288
When he retired from the CDC in 1989, Nancy Binkin (EIS ’80) writing in the
EIS Bulletin called Gregg a “CDC legend.” Dr Binkin lauded him as the keeper of CDC’s
institutional memory and the person who, as Deputy Director of the Bureau of
Epidemiology (1970-81) and the Epidemiology Program Office (1981-89), smoothed the
EIS leadership transition from Alex Langmuir to Phil Brachman to Carl Tyler. To
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MMWR he brought the “Editorial Notes” that accompany each article that “greatly
increased the lay audience’s comprehension of the MMWR” in addition to raising the
number of subscribers from 20,000 in 1967 to more than a half million by 1988 when he
left.289 A consultant in epidemiology, Dr. Gregg continues to engage students today as he
did throughout his career at CDC.290 Ever the teacher and humanitarian, his closing
remarks to the author included an appraisal of the current method by which EIS officers
track patient records from investigation outbreaks. The use of computers, he said, may
distance officers from the human aspects of outbreaks. Begin with paper, he advised; it
brings the officer closer to recognition of the individuals who constitute the population
under investigation.291 Dr. Gregg was the last Chief to have spent his entire tenure under
Langmuir.
“I was a kid from Altoona, PA who had gone to medical school. I was always
interested in international health. I wanted to ‘see the world.’”292 As a third-year medical
student, Bob Sharrar (EIS ’67) got that opportunity. A summer elective in 1965 took him
to a mission hospital in West Pakistan. It was there that he met and worked with Mike
Gregg while serving at the Lahore Research Center studying parasites and clinical
nutrition. After returning to the U.S., he finished medical school, completed an internship
at N.Y.’s Bellevue Hospital, and applied to the USPHS to become a CDC epidemiologist.
It was then that he received a call from EIS Chief Gregg asking if he would be interested
in joining the EIS to work in a state health department in general epidemiology and on
measles control. Sharrar became an EIS officer in the large (67 officers, coincidentally)
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1967 class. After spending a year in Des Moines, Iowa, Alex Langmuir appointed him
Assistant EIS Chief. Unlike his predecessor, Sharrar was an EIS officer.
The EIS also sent him to investigate shigella293 in Ohio, tuberculosis in
Washington, DC, family planning in South Georgia, and food relief during the NigerianBiafran War.294
His duties included those usual for the Chief: planning the spring conference,
setting up training, and recruiting. What Langmuir seemed to be especially interested in
at that time, however, was someone skilled in reviewing qualifications and screening
candidates. “Alex wanted people with specialties that fit with epidemiology. My role was
to balance the need for skills with the quality of the people and the places they were
needed. ... We vied for the services of officers with other branches of CDC. Alex would
negotiate with the branch chiefs.” After his time as Chief, Sharrar continued in public
health, holding epidemiology directorships within the Philadelphia City Health
Department and supervising field officers. In 1976, he and his officers contributed to
solving the mystery of Legionnaires’ disease during the outbreak at the BellevueStratford Hotel.295 He has since gone on to positions of responsibility for vaccine
development (“…something close to my heart…”) and product safety at the
pharmaceutical firm, Merck & Co. Sharrar’s position as Chief was unique in that he
served in the last year of Langmuir’s directorship and the first year of his successor,
Philip Brachman. He told an interviewer that his contribution to public health has been
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his interest in vaccine development and safety; work that began while he was an EIS
officer.296
As with all the Chiefs, Sharrar was profoundly influenced by the position’s
responsibilities and its proximity to Langmuir. When asked about the effect of being
Chief under Langmuir on his professional life, he said, “This has been a powerful
influence on me. He is one of my mentors. I think of him often. In fact, I have a framed
picture of him in my office, signed by him, hanging on the wall.”297
To the end of the 1960s, Langmuir used the Chief’s position to further the goals
of the EIS. He put his stamp on the position and its occupants as he did upon all aspects
of field epidemiology both at CDC throughout the U.S. as a whole.298 With the passing of
the decade and of Langmuir into “retirement,”299 the Chief’s role would change even
more than it did in 1963 with the establishment of the surveillance and investigation
branches, and the 1966 establishment of the State Services Division, dividing the
incoming classes into “house” and “field.” The 1970s would present new challenges that
would change the EIS and the CDC.
The CDC’s mission in the 1970s had become one of prevention, not just disease
control. The EIS would be sought to help anticipate crises, not just react. The addition of
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) gave the CDC entry
into an important and emerging area of public health: the workplace. At this time, chronic
disease epidemiology came into its own. Major events of this decade included the last
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wild polio case reported in the U.S. (1979) and the worldwide eradication of smallpox
(1977).300 It was also a time when nature struck back in the form of new infectious
diseases such as Lassa fever, Ebola hemorrhagic fever, and Marburg hemorrhagic fever.
The year 1970 saw the retirement of Alex Langmuir from the CDC. Langmuir had
created the EIS to match Joseph Mountin’s vision. He had also created the Chief’s
position and hand-picked the officers to fill it. After Langmuir’s departure, the Chief’s
role would be different.
Although he did not serve as Chief under Alex Langmuir,301 Dr. Douglas Huber’s
(EIS ’70) position was very much like those belonging to the era of the EIS founder. It
could be said that his tenure was the last of the Langmuir-type Chiefs. His duties were the
same: recruiting, selecting, planning the conference, organizing training, and taking care
of the Atlanta officers assigned to investigations. Huber hadn’t considered the Chief’s
position until encouraged to seek it by outgoing Chief, Robert Sharrar. “Bob sort of
‘drafted’ me into the position.”302 Once in the job, though, Huber found it had certain
advantages. The Chief got to see what was going on all across the EIS and CDC public
health programs. He felt he developed close connections with other officers in his class
because of the Chief’s position as well as with the incoming class through his recruiting
activities. Being close to the surveillance publication, MMWR, was another “plus” that
accrued to being Chief that Huber mentioned in an interview.
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He was influenced by Brachman to the extent that one of his investigations
resulted in a paper published in the Journal of the American Medical Association303 and
the establishment of a drug abuse epidemiology section, which was favored by the new
Director of the Bureau of Epidemiology.304 “Deaths from [heroin] drug overdoses had
gone from 3-5 per year to 20. This investigation … was front-page news in Atlanta.
Autopsies were not definitive so that necessitated many interviews with family members,
friends, and survivors. Another benefit of the effort was the opportunity to create a dialog
with the state public health department people. The conclusion was that an increase in the
strength of the drug dosage was the cause of the deaths.”305
Although the role entailed a great deal of extra work, Huber was glad to have
been Chief. He thought one of the best things about it was the exposure to a single
overseas outbreak that played an important part in his career. International health work is
what motivated him to join the EIS in the first place, but he had been a bit disappointed
that few opportunities arose. “One notable instance,” he recalled, “however, was the
investigation of an outbreak in Guam. I returned the ‘long way’ through South Asia. This
afforded me the chance to see what was going in Bangladesh, and other parts of Asia in
family planning, smallpox, and other areas of public health.”306 Huber’s special interest
today is family planning which necessitates frequent trips to Africa and Asia.307 Other
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activities include consulting with the World Health Organization (WHO)308 and
reviewing, as a peer, techniques and procedures that affect reproductive health care.309
The major issue facing Huber as Chief was connected to working with the officers
sent on outbreak investigation assignments. This involved confronting CDC division
directors who felt they “owned” the Atlanta-based EIS officers. It had to be handled
diplomatically as the officers needed to prepare the way for their careers within those
divisions while meeting their EIS obligations. It was here that Huber got the opportunity
to hone the administrative skills that would serve him well later in his career.310 These
occasions were also opportunities for the Chiefs to be influential in keeping the EIS and
its officers focused on epidemiology. Handling the administrative tasks with professional
aplomb smoothed the “ruffled feathers” of CDC division and branch heads as well as
state supervisors, taking the pressure off the officers and easing tensions. Being the Chief
benefited Huber and the EIS by forging strong relationships “with a highly collegial
community of scientists who knew and liked each other.” It also “benefited public health
at home and abroad as it brought new recruits into EIS and then on to CDC, public health
departments in the states, and international public health & medical organizations. The
bonds forged were both personal and professional.”311 The work of the Chief would
continue under Philip Brachman although EIS officers would not be the ones to do it.
Philip Brachman assumed the position of Director of the Bureau of Epidemiology
in 1970 upon the retirement of Alexander Langmuir. He faced the difficulty of
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maintaining the class sizes as budgets were being cut. A year later, it was decided that the
Chief’s job should be changed to “EIS Coordinator.” EIS officers would henceforth
concentrate on outbreak investigation and not be distracted by tasks that could be handled
by non-physicians. As Brachman said in an interview, “It was an administrative
position.”312 He assumed some of the tasks of the Chief himself, such as editing the EIS
Bulletin. As the military draft was suspended in 1973, an important recruiting incentive
was discontinued. The EIS’s reputation and its network of alumni, however, helped to
keep the applicant level steady. The most important reason for the continued flow of
extraordinarily qualified people might have been the formalizing of the recruitment
process. This was accomplished by the third Coordinator in the first four years of
Brachman’s tenure; Mary Moreman.
Moreman had risen in the ranks of CDC when it was difficult for women who
were not M.D.’s to advance. A former administrative assistant, she took the
Coordinator’s job in 1974. She immediately improved the recruiting process by having
marketing materials created. Up to that time, there had not even been a brochure available
to distribute to prospective candidates! At this time, the Medical Elective in
Epidemiology was established at CDC for senior year medical students. She recruited for
that as well and noted that many of the students elected to apply to the EIS because of
that experience.313 She took advantage of the EIS veterans’ ability to “talent spot,” and
combined it with her own efforts to establish a recruitment routine that was less
haphazard than in the first two decades. “We relied on EIS alumni to facilitate recruiting
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sessions around the country, and current EIS officers would accompany me on the
recruiting trips.”314
With the staffing shortage acute due to budget cuts, Moreman played an important
role assisting Brachman and Gregg in organizing the spring conference. She also
contributed by managing the logistics of the “match” process through which the officers’
requests for assignment were processed. Being a non-physician seemed not to affect her
relationship with the EIS program staff and the officers. “They saw me as approachable. I
was a link to both Brachman and Gregg. I acted as a friend and confidant to the officers.
They never saw me as a threat, and would tell me things they would never tell their
supervisors.”315 In sum, Moreman provided the administrative expertise necessary to the
position of Coordinator as Brachman was, in effect, his own Chief.
State Branch, as of 1966, was looking out for officers in the field assignments,
reviewing monthly reports and manuscripts, and could provide experienced, professional
advice when needed. Moreman could concentrate on discharging the position’s
administrative duties without the distraction of outbreak investigation. As a consequence,
those processes were done with efficiency and dispatch. What was missing, however, was
the benefit to the officers who would have held the position. The experience under the
new EPO Director might have been different for a physician or a Ph.D. as Brachman’s
and Langmuir’s personalities were markedly different. Nonetheless, if Huber’s
experience is any guide, the position could have offered an exposure to public health
unlike any other in field epidemiology.
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Moreman continued her work in the program until 1991. The classes of this
period continued to be filled with outstanding and diverse candidates. They include
current CDC officials such as Claire V. Broome, M.P.H., M.D. (EIS ’77), Senior Adviser
for Integrated Health Information Systems; Walter W. Williams, M.P.H., M.D. (EIS ‘81),
Associate Director for Minority Health; Jose F. Cordero, M.P.H., M.D. (EIS ’79),
Director of the National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities; and
Stephen B. Thacker, M.Sc., M.D. (EIS ’76), Director of the Office of Workforce and
Career Development and a former director of EPO.
Moreman’s contribution to public health, she said, was in the support she gave to
the officers. She was recognized in 1986 with the Brachman Award from the EIS
Alumni. To an interviewer she said “My experience with the EIS program was a
rewarding and fulfilling one. I still maintain contact and friendship with a number of
former officers. They had a positive impact on my life as well.”316 The return of
physicians filling the role of Chief would have to wait for Brachman’s successor as
Director of the Epidemiology Program Office,317 Carl Tyler (EIS ’66), in 1983.
The 1980s was a decade in which environmental and lifestyle concerns came to
the fore in disease control and prevention. The first five pneumocystis pneumonia cases
from Los Angeles in 1981 were reported by Wayne Shandera, an EIS field officer.318 The
following year the cause of it would be named AIDS. The EIS Bulletin referred to it as
the pandemic of the century.319 Other activities included greater focus on the environment
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in places such as Love Canal, NY, investigating the health effects of toxic wastes located
close to residential areas and in the areas around the Mt. St. Helen’s volcanic eruption.
Product safety concerns arose in cases of toxic shock syndrome related to women’s
sanitary apparel and aspirin’s effects on Reye’s Syndrome.320 The EIS program evolved
from a largely male, Caucasian, physician-dominated organization to one that included
more women, minority groups, and health professionals with other advanced degrees.
These changes reflected those in the CDC overall and in the society as a whole.321
When Tyler took over from Brachman, he initially performed some of the same
functions. He edited the EIS Bulletin which, before Brachman, was the purview of the
Chief. Although he appreciated the work done by the coordinators and continued to rely
on them, he instituted what is actually three levels of EIS leadership. The first is the
Director of the EPO itself. This position interacts with the highest levels of CDC
management and is responsible for overall direction of the EIS program as one among
many. At the next level is the Director of the EIS, colloquially referred to as the “Chief.”
This position is concerned with setting policy and allocating budget. The third level is
that of a medical professional similar to that of a chief resident in a teaching hospital.
This position would perform day-to-day, hands-on duties such as application reviews, the
interview process for new officers, and assisting the officers in reaching deadlines. While
not officially designated Chiefs, Tyler placed a series of physicians into these leadership
positions between himself and the coordinator. This may be explained by his having been
an EIS veteran who “grew up” under the Langmuir system. (Mike Gregg was appointed
Chief at the same time Tyler joined the EIS.) His intention was to fill the gap between the
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non-professional coordinators of EIS and his first level leadership with credible
professionals of sound scientific understanding and background.322 He wanted to avail
himself of those who would understand the bigger picture of how the EIS related to
public health from the highest to the lowest levels.
Ward Cates and Richard C. Dicker were among those that Tyler brought to the
EIS leadership level when he became Director of EPO in 1983. They were, for all intents
and purposes, his “functional chiefs.”323 They performed many of the duties familiar to
the Chiefs of the Langmuir era. They coordinated the choice of courses for the summer
training and served with the group that selected the investigations to be presented at the
spring conference. They helped to decide who would serve where in the match process as
officers vied for their assignment choices. Mary Moreman was still in place to ably assist
the EIS program through her administrative expertise, but the influence of physicians
such as Cates, Dicker, and Rick Goodman324 was in the ascendancy as it had been under
Langmuir. As Dicker said to an interviewer, “Carl [Tyler] wanted people with the same
background; EIS veterans with that common experience.”325
Of the people who were “functional” Chiefs under Tyler, Richard Dicker came to
epidemiology naturally as he greatly enjoyed problem solving and found rote
memorization tedious. Good at mathematics as an undergraduate, he suffered the first two
years of medical school as he was required to memorize and rarely to think. “Thinking
was discouraged,” he recalled. At the end of his second year, however, he fortuitously
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took a “throwaway” course in epidemiology in which the professor gave the students
population health problems to solve. “I loved it!” Aware of his student’s aptitude, the
professor, Barry Levy (EIS ’73), recommended Dicker for an elective in epidemiology at
the CDC the following year. While there, he became aware of, and interested in, the EIS.
After his residency in Portland, Oregon, he applied and was accepted as an EIS officer,
class of 1980. In his third year at CDC, following EIS training, Tyler tapped him for the
Acting Chief position with the Statistics Branch and in 1991 became Chief of
Epidemiology Training Activity. In the late 1980s, he wrote the second edition of
Principles of Epidemiology,326 a standard EIS training work. When asked about his
contribution to public health Dicker stated that he was “one step removed” from original
research. “I didn’t discover [something like] the harmful effects of lead,” he said, “but
my contribution come from the people I trained. I was a role model, teacher, and trainer
in practical epidemiology.”327
Considering the effect that being a “functional” Chief had on his career, Dicker
felt that his tenure cemented a loyalty to the EIS and field epidemiology. Having spent
ten years in various capacities with the EIS, he came to know virtually every person who
came through the program in those years. It is, to him, an enormous network. He pointed
out that the EIS has the advantage of being able to cross all the centers, institutes, and
offices at the CDC. The criticism of the agency in the 1990s, and today, is that the
specialty areas are “stovepiped,” to use former CDC director Dr. William Roper’s328
term. These areas of expertise tend to pursue their goal of bettering public health in
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relative isolation. This runs contrary, however, to the spirit of public health, which is
strongly multi-disciplinary.329 The investigative spirit of the EIS helps it to cross those
institutional boundaries and to keep it vital. “My own activity in reviewing [for
publication] papers [on outbreak investigations produced by the officers] allowed me to
see what was going on throughout the CDC.”330
In a similar way, the other physician that helped bring medical professionalism to
the management of the EIS under Tyler was also concerned to expand the activity of EIS
officers. Willard “Ward” Cates, M.P.H., M.D., M.A., (EIS ’74) assisted EPO Director
Tyler in expanding educational opportunities for EIS officers after the two-year training
course was concluded. Cates was more responsible than anyone for the establishment of
the Chief Resident for the Preventive Medicine Residency (PMR) Program331 within the
CDC.332 The program’s intent is to prepare physicians to be public health leaders through
exposure to the multiple disciplines that contribute to public health practice. He also
established the third-year position within the EIS’s Division of Training that has evolved
into the position of Chief of the EIS. This position is different from the one that
Langmuir created in that it was less for promising officers in the incoming classes than a
job for “third-year” officers. It was “a position that would deal with planning,
administration, and teaching.”333 The position would one day be assumed by Polly
Marchbanks and Douglas Hamilton and be designated “Chief, EIS Program.”
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Cates had come to public health through his service in the U.S. Army during the
Vietnam era. He earned a Master’s in Public Health while in medical school. (“I was
interested in public health even then!”) He discharged his service obligation from his
days in college ROTC as a preventive medicine physician in the Army. Cates spent a
number of years in both family planning and HIV/AIDS at the CDC.334 When EPO
Director, Steve Thacker, created the Division of Training, he tapped Cates to be Director.
He brought the EIS program and the Preventive Medicine Residency together during his
three-year tenure.335 Considered a world expert in abortion safety and surveillance, Cates
is now President of the Institute for Family Health, a non-profit organization funded by
USAID and the NIH to deal with HIV prevention, contraception, and other family health
issues. At the end of the decade, a new head of epidemiology at the CDC would firmly
re-establish the Chief’s position. It also would not be the temporary position that
Langmuir had established but rather a career option for former officers with an interest
and aptitude for the work.
“As any good EIS alum knows, public health is anything but predictable.”336 The
1990s saw the emergence of new diseases such as Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome,
influenza A [H5N1], and Nipah virus, which kept the EIS on its investigative toes during
the decade. In response, the CDC created a new peer-reviewed, online journal, Emerging
Infectious Diseases.337 EIS leadership saw that existing channels of communication must
work more effectively and there was a need to open new channels through innovations
such as the Internet. The Chief’s position was affected by the personnel changes in the
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1980s toward a more diverse workforce as was true in the society as a whole. Upon
assuming the directorship of the EPO in late 1989, Thacker addressed the role of
diversity in an interview. “…achieving diversity in our EIS Classes will help us to reach
different segments of the population…improve our training activities at CDC, and our
sensitivity to issues in other populations.” In thinking about the role of minorities and
women within the EIS, he said, “I believe [our attention] to this has been reflected
already with the EIS officers we have successfully recruited who have come from
different minority groups and, certainly, with the increasing number and percentage of
officers who are women.”338 The effort at creating a more diverse workforce within EIS
resulted in the choice of the first woman, who was also the first non-physician, to assume
the role of Chief.
When interviewed about being the first woman Chief, Polly A. Marchbanks,
Ph.D., M.S.N., (EIS ’85), echoed the words of EPO head Thacker about diversity: “…it
means that doors are opening for people from diverse backgrounds and orientations.” She
also went beyond that to what would become an important and controversial issue for her
and the EIS during her tenure. “It’s meaningful to be the first woman, but it’s personally
more meaningful to be the first non-physician.”339 Marchbanks understood that as Chief,
she would exercise influence over the officers’ experience. She saw it as an opportunity
to not only train top-notch epidemiologists but also future public health leaders. She saw
that the EIS needed to be eclectic to meet the demands of epidemiology and public
health. This meant applying fairness to recruiting and selection. The EIS needed to be a
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place where Ph.D.s, and not only physicians, were actively encouraged and supported.
Her “heightened sensitivity” to issues of fairness stemmed from the gender bias she faced
as the only female physics and trigonometry student in her high school to the dismissive
attitudes of her university professors when she expressed interest in the EIS.340 She was
quick to credit EIS veterans Willard “Ward” Cates, Herbert “Bert” Peterson (EIS ’79),
David Grimes, (EIS ‘75), and George Rubin (EIS ’78) for encouraging her to apply to the
EIS despite the discouragement she felt.341
This concern extended to the experience of the officers, once chosen. Marchbanks
felt it was important to be accessible to the officers and that their professional goals had
to be considered alongside the needs of the investigation assignment. The third phase of
the EIS experience began at the conclusion of the two-year training course and centered
on activities and information conduits. The EIS Bulletin was an important way for alumni
to stay connected to the program and each other along with the spring conference and the
Tuesday morning seminars.342 To that end, Marchbanks wrote a column in the Bulletin
every issue that she was Chief except for the few when she was away from Atlanta.343 It
was in the EIS Bulletin that she published a memo to officers, alumni, and selected CDC
staff offering a preview of her tenure as Chief. After lauding the program and the staff
with whom she worked, Marchbanks invited participation in the shaping the futures of
both the Bulletin and the EIS as a whole. Her last point was an appeal for an openminded approach to the way the EIS went about its business.344 As her tenure progressed,
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her attention would be focused on the recruiting, selecting, assigning, and even the
remuneration of officers.
“[A] big issue was the equal pay for equal work thing. I considered it a
professional victory. My advocacy for this was greeted by a whole spectrum of
reactions.” Marchbanks’s belief that officers, regardless of physician vs. non-physician
status, should receive equal pay caused a great deal of controversy and elicited intense
emotional reactions. There were those who said things such as, “Go into the bathroom
and cry,” and “Physicians are valued more and should be paid more.” She said in an
interview, “I remember one day a man on a bicycle stopped and said ‘thanks!’ I didn’t
even know who he was! Other people were resentful of the situation. It was very
emotional. People still bring this up to me.” In challenging the status quo, Marchbanks
was guided by a very simple principle: “Physicians in a training program [in which
everyone starts at the same level] should not be making more money. They’re all
supposed to be learning epidemiology.”345
True to another of her stated ambitions for the program, there was an increase in
the number of non-physicians recruited and selected as officers while she was Chief. As
she explained, “The EIS historically had been inclined to recruit more for infectious
disease. So I was interested in officers for non-infectious diseases [in response to national
trends].” Another result that benefited the program was that more Ph.D.s became
interested in infectious diseases.346 With the support of Division of Training Director,
Ward Cates, Marchbanks also introduced the idea of competencies for officers. They
included “Epidemiology,” “Communication,” and “Professionalism.” Renamed “Core
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Activities for Learning,” they were announced in the EID Bulletin.347 The last
acknowledged, and sought to address, the problems between officers and supervisors that
occurred during assignments.348
In looking back upon her experience as Chief, Marchbanks said her role was “…
all about making the officers’ experiences better.” In addition to her success in
emphasizing the value and participation of non-physicians, the introduction of the
competencies, and the controversial “equal-pay-for-equal-work” provision, she took on
other issues. She recalled supporting the idea that more officers should be allowed to
travel to scientific conferences, though budgets would not permit it. She mentioned
specifically the American Society of Epidemiology annual conference which she thought
would be a great experience for officers. She regretted that budget constraints also
affected the assignments that could be offered. True to Langmuir’s insistence that the EIS
epidemiological experience should be as wide-ranging as possible, she sent chronic
disease-focused officers on more infectious disease investigations and vice versa when
the budget permitted. She was appreciative of and valued the teamwork within the EPO
that made serving as EIS Chief so exhilarating.349
Any summary of her tenure as Chief, the effect she had on the program, and her
ongoing contribution to public health would note her attention to the quality and
distribution of education and training for public health workers and her desire to always
be trustworthy and credible. An expression of her commitment to both public health and
to individual patients may be illustrated by an event that occurred when she was an EIS
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officer investigating the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among residents of Belle Glade,
Florida. A prostitute who had been reluctant to be interviewed appeared at the health
department and asked “for the lady with a lot of gray hair.” After completing the
interview, Marchbanks asked why the woman had sought her out specifically. She replied
“Word on the streets is that you’re OK.”350 After holding the position for three years,
Marchbanks moved to the Division for Reproductive Health.351 In addition to her effect
on the program as Chief, she was important as the culmination of the EIS’s efforts to
create more diverse officer classes; reaching out to women, minorities, and nonphysicians. Her personal contribution was to fulfill the promise of that effort by
extending opportunities to recruits and officers wherever and whenever she could. Her
successor would follow in those footsteps while placing her own stamp on the program.
In the summer of 1994, Joanna Buffington, M.P.H., M.D., M.S., (EIS ’90) was set
to take over the position of “Medical Epidemiologist” in the EPO’s Division of Training
at CDC headquarters in Atlanta. She had just finished a CDC Preventive Medicine
Residency assignment at the New Hampshire state health department as well as her
Master’s Degree in Public Health from Harvard University. She fully expected to be
Chief Resident for the Preventive Medicine Residency (PMR) program, supervising six
residents in state positions. She would also be the Assistant Chief for the EIS Program
under Polly Marchbanks. She would have responsibility for the Fall Course for EIS
officers. The Fall Course emphasized oral presentation and scientific writing skills and
made instruction in them more easily available to officers.352 As CDC had paid for the
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MPH, Buffington was required to serve two years at CDC. She expected to discharge that
by assisting Marchbanks with the Chief’s role. As Buffington recalled, “Six months into
that, Polly left and I was in charge almost by default.” She brought to the job the same
orientation toward chronic disease that had motivated Marchbanks and was beginning to
pervade the CDC. She sought to continue and even expand the effectiveness of her
predecessor.353
Buffington’s duties consisted of everything that Langmuir’s Chiefs did, with the
notable exception of outbreak investigation, and a lot of Langmuir’s responsibilities
toward the officers. She had charge of the summer and fall courses already as well as the
supervision of the PMRs. She had also been doing recruiting, assessing, and selecting
candidates, and evaluating the competency domains recently established under the Core
Activities for Learning. To that was added deployment of officers to “epi-aids” events,
planning and executing the spring conference and evaluating officer performances.
Buffington also dealt with personnel problems. “There were only two but they were time
consuming.”354 The EIS Chief was performing the tasks that originally defined the
position even though it was not filled by a current officer. With all the duties assigned to
her, Buffington years later in an interview mentioned something else she would have
liked to accomplish. “I think it would be good to go back to the position later in my
career. I would provide more mentoring opportunities. I would have a better perspective
at longer distance from the beginning of my career.”355 This, perhaps, is the direction
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Langmuir had decided on when he confined Gregg to administrative duties and selected
the experienced Gangarosa.
Of the effect that she had on public health through her activities as Chief,
Buffington thought she had established a network of people in the states who were
“passionate, outspoken, and reliable.”356 They were people who could be counted on to
act in concert with federal public health in cases of outbreaks and other emergencies. She
was also proud of the effect she had as a recruiter and selector. There are people, she said,
who are engaged in public health that might otherwise have never entered the field but
for her intervention. It illustrates the importance of having a Chief with experience of the
CDC, the EIS, and public health when dealing with the wider variety of recruits than had
been seen before the 1980s.
“Here’s a story,” she related, “that shows how important personal intervention is
to the recruiting-interview-match process: A radiologist on Martha’s Vineyard wanted to
be in public health…She was not an obviously good candidate but was sincere in her
interest… Anyway, she got into CDC and is doing public health.” On another occasion “a
pharmacist applied who was told he was not eligible. I looked as his C.V. and decided
otherwise. He had a doctoral degree, PharmD, He’d been doing HIV and hospital public
health. He eventually got into CDC’s HIV program.”357 The position had been
established as an administrative job worthy of long-term attention by a career staff
member. For that reason, the addition of the “Professionalism” competency for EIS
officers could also be said to apply to the Chief’s position.
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Buffington’s successor, Douglas Hamilton, would turn out to be the longestserving Chief in the 50+-year history of the EIS. Hamilton would lead the EIS into the
21st century through the immediate threat of bio-terrorism in the aftermath of the
inhalation anthrax outbreak of late 2001. The EIS, and its Chief, were returned to their
origins by this emphasis. Epidemiologists will be the first line of defense in the event of a
biological attack as Langmuir in 1951 said that they would be.
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Chapter 5: The Chief in 2006 and the Outlook for the Future
As the previous chapter has suggested, the role of the EIS Chief has been
influenced by political, social, and economic forces as well as intra-organizational trends
and currents to say nothing of the effects of scientific development on the performance of
the EIS. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the state of the EIS in the context of its
current Chief and to examine what the position is likely to encounter in the years ahead.
At the start of the 21st century, the premier field epidemiology training program in the
world faces challenges both old and new. The increased public awareness of bio-terror
threats has the EIS poised to address preparedness for that possibility as it had in 1951.
The old adversary, influenza, is once again an ominous threat; this time in its avian form.
In addition to bio-defense and investigation, there are many population health problems
reflective of the drive to globalize in the midst of shifting political and cultural
alignments in a less than stable post-Cold War world. If that weren’t enough, there are
always the budget battles and the political fight to keep the EIS “on track” to provide
well-rounded epidemiology training. It is not, however, a grim picture by any means.
Despite the infectious and chronic disease problems the Chief must confront in an
era of constrained budgets, he has the advantages that 50 years of service, achievement,
and recognition have conferred on the program. Although the processes of selection and
training are rigorous and the hours sometimes very long, there is no shortage of able
people wanting to be EIS officers. While in another era, the Chiefs worried about
drawing enough recruits with the necessary prerequisite skills with which to fill out a new
group of trainees, the EIS receives anywhere from four to five times the number of
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qualified applicants each year than there are places in the class.358 The sense of
camaraderie and shared commitment that are among the hallmarks of the program also
helps to sustain EIS officers both in the field and in headquarters assignments. That adds
up to a potent and effective force in the hands of an experienced and dedicated Chief. The
current Chief of the EIS is Douglas H. Hamilton, M.D., a family medicine practitioner,
Ph.D. microbiologist, and EIS veteran, class of ’91, who began his EIS career as a field
officer stationed in Connecticut. He is the heir to the position that was shaped by the
people and events of the previous five decades of the EIS’s existence. The EIS Chief is
literally at the forefront of American field epidemiology. While somewhat self-effacing
in discussing his role, Hamilton’s challenges are as great, if not greater, than any of his
predecessors. Part of his job involves coping not only with the changed world of “post9/11,” but also with a general global re-alignment.
As Hamilton was recruited into the EIS, the Cold War was ending. In 1991 the
Soviet Union had broken up into a collection of states the boundaries of which were those
of the former Soviet republics they had recently been. While this global re-alignment
signaled the end of the competition between the world’s nuclear-armed superpowers, the
“victory” of democratic capitalism was not a foregone conclusion. Many observers saw
the new “world order” as revolving around culture more than the old relationships of
political convenience formed during the Cold War. Nations would now align themselves
in a different way. The dangers of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare were
no longer confined to two tightly-controlled blocs; one Western and market capitalistoriented and the other driven by Communist ideology. Now the former republics of the
Soviet Union, some of whom possessed weapons of mass destruction, were free to align
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with whomever they wished. Some contained sizable populations of Muslims. Since the
founding of Israel in 1948, the Arab Muslim world had clashed repeatedly with the West.
The possibility that these weapons could fall into the hands of rogue states or, worse,
stateless terrorists, began to concern public health leaders as well as defense strategists.
The problem especially concerns the EIS when thinking about biological warfare. In
some ways, this part of the job is a “throw-back” to an earlier time.
Our national system of surveillance has been seen as a reliable first line of defense
against natural outbreaks and biological attack since the 1950s. The system was the
brainchild of Langmuir and his protégé, D.A. Henderson, still the only officer to be
appointed Chief for two non-consecutive stints and a strong advocate for bio-defense.359
Continual surveillance would keep the country’s food and water supply safe. “Biopreparedness,” as it has been termed, is therefore an important part of the Chief’s job
when training epidemiologists. Said Hamilton, “We had always incorporated some bioweapons training for our officers [in the summer course] prior to 2001. After that, we
expanded the time devoted to training.”360 Once alerted to the possibility of a biological
incident, the EIS would almost certainly be asked to assist in the investigation. The Chief,
then, would assign the necessary officers if they were not already there.
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New
York City and the Pentagon building in Washington DC, the threat seemed to become
more likely. The cutaneous anthrax outbreaks that originated in letters sent to news
organizations postmarked September 18, 2001 and the inhalation anthrax spores later sent
to the Washington, D.C., offices of U.S. Senators Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and
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Thomas Daschle (D-South Dakota) confirmed this. Although still unsolved with no
suspects named, they were the first high-profile biological warfare attacks of the postSoviet era. After the EIS concluded its part in the investigation, EIS Chief Hamilton
responded by increasing the amount of time spent on bio-terror investigation and defense
procedures during the EIS Summer Training Course.361 When thinking about the weighty
responsibility he would bear should another incident occur, Hamilton can look to the past
for a precedent. In 1951, biological attack and defense were on the minds of citizens and
legislators as well as public health officers.362
The present concern about bio-terrorism echoes some of the worries that were
evident to public health practitioners in the first years of the Cold War. The Epidemic
Intelligence Service founder, Alexander Langmuir, was instrumental in alerting the
nation to the possibility of “germ warfare” as it was then called. Indeed, the origin of the
EIS and whole system of national surveillance were the result of the country’s increased
concern about biological threats to national security. “When Alex Langmuir asked for
funding for an EIS, he was laughed at until he said that the Russians are doing it and that
we should be prepared,” said Hamilton. “He [then] got all the money he needed.”363 Alex
Langmuir, indeed, secured funding by convincing Congress and the American people that
“germ warfare” was a reality and that only field epidemiologists could protect the country
in the case of a biological attack. He employed the relatively new medium of television to
get his message across to the ordinary citizen.364 He saw a chance at the same time to
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make sure epidemiology would grow in size and effectiveness. For Assistant Surgeon
General Joseph Mountin to realize his dream of “centers of excellence” in public health
around the relatively new Communicable Disease Center (CDC), there needed to be a
great many more trained epidemiologists than existed at that time. They would be needed
to combat both infectious and chronic diseases. Langmuir, as has previously been noted,
had developed a plan to train them but needed the funding. The Cold War and recent
“hot” war in Korea focused public attention on national defense. Langmuir knew that if
the public were concerned about “germ warfare,” Congress would fund the EIS. Without
the fear of biological vulnerability, the program might never get the money it needed.
Once funded, Langmuir was intent upon getting that funding renewed annually. A CDC
Epidemiologic Services internal memo listing the duties of the new officers, dated
September 1951, stated
(6) TO SERVE AS AUDITORS OR JUNIOR CONSULTANTS TO BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
DEFENSE COMMITTEES OF STATES AND STRATEGIC CENTERS WITHIN THEIR AREAS
365
OF ASSIGNMENT.
Thus it was made clear from the start that meeting the biological warfare defense
needs of the country would be a stated goal of the EIS. In 2001, the EIS responded to
both the terrorist attacks on September 11 and the anthrax outbreaks a few weeks later.
While the officers performed well in the emergency situations, the Chief knew that
success would bring problems just as surely as failure. Monitoring opinion in the
Congress, by “watching C-SPAN [Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network dedicated to
airing non-stop government proceedings and public affairs programming366] on my
computer,” Hamilton heard frequent references to the need to “build up CDC in general
365
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and the EIS in particular.” However good it sounded, the Chief was mindful of his
mother’s dictum, “Be careful what you wish for!” In reviewing the strategy for dealing
with an increased class size, one result of new appropriations, he was worried about the
“strings” attached to the funding: being asked to put additional officers in field positions.
That provision would strain the “match” program whereby officers were allowed to
request assignments, and created a concern for morale. Another problem was that not
every state had the “epidemiologic infrastructure” to ensure the proper training
environment. Hamilton thought that to prepare some states for EIS officers, CDC would
have to assign experienced personnel for perhaps years, which was what the Division of
Field Services had been doing since 1966.367 Bio-terror defense had become necessary
for a single superpower coping with a confusing and threatening world.
“Globalization” in general presents a great many health problems and
opportunities. The current trend toward globalization has affected the distribution of
health care and public health services around the world. The immediacy of public health
issues related to this trend is summed up in the view of former Surgeon General, C.
Everett Koop: “Economic globalization cannot take place if the health of developing
nations is not tremendously improved. These nations are too sick to contribute to
economic globalization; only the globalization of good health can change that
situation.”368 This presents a challenge to EIS leadership as the perceptions and effects of
disease change. For Hamilton, it is important to keep the program focused on
epidemiology in its totality.369 The ills of a globalizing and modernizing world will
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require different responses.370 The previous trend in public health was to progress from
struggle with virulent pestilential diseases largely controllable through sanitary
engineering and quarantine to coping with the chronic illnesses of advanced societies.371
Infectious diseases were perpetually a problem in lesser developed countries but the
essential technology and science were there to bring them under control. As affluence
spread over time, the problems would be solved. Except for Africa, this has largely been
the case. Countries in Asia and Latin America have seen great gains in public health as
their living standards have risen. Singapore is a case in point.372 Infectious disease
pandemics, threatening advanced nations as well as developing ones, however, are
making a comeback.
According to World Health Organization (WHO) communicable diseases expert,
David L. Heymann, M.D., (EIS ’76) Executive Director of the Communicable Disease
Cluster at the World Health Organization, the past 30 years have witnessed the
resurgence of infectious diseases.373 This resurgence is occurring in an era characterized
by three important aspects of globalizing economies: increased trade, the migration of
populations, and the movement of capital. Each presents both problems and opportunities
for public health organizations. More trade and migration from poorer, infectious-disease
ravaged countries to advanced, but unwary, nations will test the global surveillance
system. Public health is also seen to have strategic geopolitical implications.374 The
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conditions under which the EIS are called upon to investigate have changed accordingly.
If the EIS merely investigated, solved the immediate problem, and moved on, the changes
happening in a world defined by culture instead of ideology would be less troubling. The
history of the EIS, however, is of a program whose agents, the officers in the field,
recommend changes necessary to prevent the health problem from occurring.375 When the
recommendation for prevention is outside the realm of sanitary engineering and other
prophylaxis, it becomes a policy issue for the Chief to consider. Globalization presents
the EIS with potentially very different challenges on top of all the familiar ones.376
Raised standards of living have been the greatest contributors to improvements in
the overall health and longevity of populations.377 That the health of a population could
decline rapidly when exposed to infectious diseases at a time of extreme emergency and
extraordinary disruption has often been demonstrated in times of war and natural disaster.
In the early part of the twentieth century, H1N1 influenza killed as many as 50 million
people world wide in the wake of the Great War. One of the greatest public health
disasters in history, however, the Black Death of the 14th century, was the result of
increased contact and extensive travel along the trade routes from China to India and on
to Europe. The virulent bubonic plague destroyed one-third of the population from India
to Iceland. Though no great pandemic followed World War II, by the 1970s and into the
1980s, new infectious diseases caught public health experts by surprise. By the early
1960s, people around the world were anticipating the control of infectious disease in
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advanced countries as a prelude to conquering them worldwide. There is evidence that
complacency had afflicted contagious disease experts.378 The “bugs,” however, showed
they were not leaving quietly and our technological advancement has contributed to
making us more vulnerable to them.379
Infectious diseases can be spread from continent to continent, traveling
undetected within a 36-hour period to anywhere in the world since the advent of intercontinental jet travel. Greater connectivity bringing greater access has brought
recognition of how the spread of communicable illness is aided by modern
transportation.380 It is perhaps no surprise that the “index case” (the person to whom the
origins of an epidemic can be traced) for HIV in the U.S. was believed, erroneously as it
turned out, to be a gay flight attendant.381 Thus the global air travel network was
understood to represent, for good and for ill, a shrinking world. The spread of new (HIV,
hemorrhagic fevers, SARS) and old (tuberculosis, MRSA) infectious diseases are the
direct result of increased travel and wider transportation connections. Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) spread from China to Toronto by air, which led to the
quarantine of patients and healthcare workers as recently as 2003.382
Globalization, however, also brings other problems related to population health.
The diseases of advanced countries are spreading to countries recently developed.
“Peripheral countries” in addition to the advanced, industrialized nations, are finding that
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the change to a physically less-demanding urban existence invites the kinds of health
problems that accompany increased longevity paired with sedentary lifestyles.383
Many chronic diseases were once thought to be endemic only to advanced
industrialized countries. They were considered to be the result of poor “lifestyle” choices
by people whose selections were uninformed or simply more convenient. The infectious
diseases that have traditionally concerned public health practitioners, such as yellow
fever or measles, tended to manifest debilitating symptoms almost immediately
necessitating prompt attention and, in turn, facilitating patient compliance in treatment
and care.
Obesity is a health problem the effects of which are cumulative and drawn out,
making it difficult to treat. Obesity is now a global problem. It has been noted that the
year 2000 was the date that the world’s overweight population exceeded the number of
people estimated to be underweight.384 This is a remarkable statistic that, while a measure
of some success in the distribution of foodstuffs, is of concern to health officials.385 A
recent EIS investigation of obesity trends in the U.S. population found that, contrary to
current popular belief, there were no differences in obesity levels on the basis of either
income or ethnic group.386
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In other areas of chronic diseases, there is much that epidemiologists can do, and
have done, in controlling their occurrence as well as documenting their origins and
charting their clusters. Chronic diseases are more intractable than many infectious
diseases and less susceptible to legislative remedy.387 The U.S. is a leader in the
dissemination of health-related information and per capita income yet evidence shows
growing early onset of non-communicable diseases because of unhealthy lifestyle
choices. 388 The EIS has investigated the prevalence of such diseases as asthma, Type II
diabetes, links between family history, coronary heart disease, and adult obesity. Chronic
Disease Epidemiology is an example of a direction in public health practice historically
advocated by CDC epidemiologists. Such programs were part of EIS founder Alexander
Langmuir’s vision which he pushed from the early days of CDC .389 Hamilton sees his
role as continuing the tradition of training in this important area. The annual EIS
conference provides a forum for reporting on chronic disease investigations. In 2005,
conference participants delivered investigation reports on chronic diseases in 36 out of
the 125 scheduled oral and poster presentations, working out to more than 1 in 4.390 The
program, the content of which is determined in large measure and approved by the Chief,
gives the assembled officers, former officers, new recruits, and the media an overview of
federal public health aid to the states and to people around the world. The Chief thus
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helps to provide highlights of the breadth of epidemiologic investigations at CDC. With
some notable exceptions, most of the infectious disease outbreaks affected much smaller
populations in developed countries than the chronic aliments studied.391 This is decidedly
not the case in lesser developed nations.
Developing countries are still ravaged by infectious diseases. Malaria is still a
danger to some 41% of the world’s population causing up to 2.7 millions deaths a year,
mostly in African children. Diarrheal diseases caused by unclean water are thought by the
World Health Organization to affect some 4 billion people each year and cause 2.2
million deaths, mostly in children.392 Public health observers such as Heymann see
problems as having emerged as early as the 1970s. Summarizing the threats, Garrett
writes about increasing anti-microbial resistance (AMR) as old pathogens adapt and
mutate rendering current medical treatments ineffective placing great stress on the
pharmaceutical industry to come up with ever-newer and more effective drugs.393 She
also chronicles the rise of “new” infectious diseases in the last 30 years such as the
filoviruses which cause the Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fevers; arenaviruses, the
most prominent of which causes Lassa fever; and retroviruses such HIV that compromise
the human immune system response and leave it open to opportunistic infections. HIV
infection is a particularly difficult pathogen to isolate within populations because it is a
slow-acting disease unlike the hemorrhagic and other fevers. At the 2005 EIS
Conference, six presentations were devoted to HIV-related topics.394
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Globalization offers incentives for those with skills in demand. In an unwelcome
situation for developing countries, physicians are leaving for high-paying jobs in the
developed world. A recent study published in the New England Journal of Medicine
revealed that between 23% and 28% of physicians in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia are international medical graduates. Less-developed
countries accounted for 40% to 75% of the international physicians that were studied.
Most came from India, Pakistan, and the Philippines. The study concluded that the
physician “brain drain” left the home countries with “weakened physician workforces”
less able to respond to HIV, AIDS, and other pressing medical needs.395 The implication
of the report is that the need for EIS activity in other countries as part of international aid
efforts, such as the recent Ebola outbreak in Angola, will likely continue. This lack of
trained medical personnel, in what used to be called the “Third World,” has the potential
to strain the EIS officer corps and to require the Chief to balance the needs of domestic
and foreign assignments with officer availability.
Another development affecting the assignment of officers abroad has recently
emerged. Western health workers on international health missions in both developed and
developing countries have encountered problems related to ethnic conflict. EIS officers in
the field have experienced this first-hand and have reported on it. Dr. Tami Zalewski (EIS
’03) conducted an investigation of the nutritional situation as it affected refugees in the
Darfur Region of Sudan. Since December 2003, violent political turmoil has led to ethnic
conflict with accusations of genocide. The EIS report called it “the worst humanitarian
crisis in present times.” EIS Officer Zalewski was part of a joint United Nations World
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Food Program emergency nutrition survey conducted among the 1.2 million internally
displaced persons and the 400,000 crisis-affected residents of the area. The report called
for immediate distribution of properly fortified rations with special attention to the needs
of children aged 6-59 months. In the question and answer period that followed, Dr.
Zalewski, a U.S. Army veterinarian, noted the security situation for humanitarian workers
was uncertain as peace talks between the warring factions had not ended the violence and
the Sudanese government had not intervened effectively.396
In May 2005, a month after Dr. Zalewski’s report, Dutch physician, Paul
Foreman, of the international medical society, Doctors Without Borders, (Medecins Sans
Frontieres) was arrested by the Sudanese for issuing a medical report on documented
rapes in the troubled region.397 This incident has exacerbated concern over health
workers’ vulnerability. Where formerly international health personnel often found
themselves in the middle of ethnic and cultural conflict, they are increasingly the targets
of disaffection. One CDC field epidemiologist involved in the “Stop Transmission of
Polio (STOP)” effort at eradication of the disease noted that some of the Indian Muslims
were reluctant to participate, believing that the polio vaccine would cause children to be
infertile.398 Another CDC field investigator reported that he has recently begun
encountering increased anti-American or anti-Western feeling on his trips, most recently
in the Congo.399 In an interview, Hamilton acknowledged that while such clashes do
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occasionally occur, it didn’t seem to be so serious a problem at this time that it would
necessitate more emphasis in training.400 He did, nevertheless, note in an article in The
EIS Bulletin his concern about such situations. In response to the report of an EIS officer
faced with a hostile crowd during the anthrax crisis, he acknowledged that it turned out
well, “despite [officers] being assigned tasks for which we don’t adequately prepare them
(i.e. “risk communication” to an angry mob) …”401 None of these developments,
however, has affected the flow of qualified candidates for admission to the EIS.
As has been noted in the previous chapter, recruitment has always been an
important part of the Chief’s job. At the program’s inception, Langmuir made sure that
physicians eligible for the military draft could opt for service in the EIS as a way of
meeting their obligation under that law. Today, even without the doctor draft and with
budget cuts that severely restrict recruiting, the EIS Chief and staff review around 300
applications for positions in each year’s class.402 The higher public profile of the CDC,
the last decade’s increased recruiting efforts directed toward Ph.D.s, and the network of
former EIS officers worldwide making recommendations has more than alleviated the
recruiting problems caused by spending cuts. The majority of the Chiefs interviewed for
this study spoke of receiving recommendations from former officers or told of how they
learned of the program from alumni who, over the years, have proven to be enthusiastic
boosters of the program. The Chiefs themselves noted that the networks they established
and sustained throughout their tenures proved fruitful. It is worth noting that current
Chief Hamilton himself was recruited informally by a former officer. As he tells it, “I
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went to a 20th anniversary high school reunion and met a physician who was also in the
PHS. He mentioned that he was a former EIS officer and described the program. It
sounded OK. ... It appealed to me because in addition to the medical training in family
medicine, I was also a Ph.D. in microbiology. I saw a chance to combine both
interests.”403 He has said that the selection of an EIS class “involves striking a delicate
balance between the qualifications of the individual candidates and the need of the
agency for officers to match in all of the CIOs [CDC Centers, Institutes, and Offices].” In
the “house” publication, The EIS Bulletin, Hamilton annually discusses the make up of
the incoming class. The recruiting class of 1999 was typical in that it consisted of 74
officers and included 43 physicians, 12 veterinarians, 17 doctoral-level scientists, and two
nurses.404
An increasingly inter-connected world offers opportunities as well as challenges
and the EIS is well-prepared for overseas assignments. Since 1958, the EIS has extended
its mission to include foreign countries.405 Not only has the EIS performed its
epidemiological services in other countries, it has recruited officers from abroad in
increasing numbers presenting the Chief with the additional task of selecting annual class
members from among these applicants. Incorporating foreign officers into EIS helps to
ensure a “global network of field epidemiologists” as part of CDC’s plan, “Preventing
Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Strategy for the 21st Century.”406 Along with the
establishment of Field Epidemiology Training Programs (FETP)407 in other countries
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since 1975, the recruitment and training of foreign officers helps keep the EIS part of a
global surveillance network.408 Managing disease outbreaks caused either intentionally,
through a bio-terrorist act, or in the normal course of human interaction requires identical
preparation. Heymann has stated that participation in global public health to “strengthen
capacity to detect and contain naturally caused outbreaks” is the only rational way to
defend the world against the threat of a bio-terrorist attack.” He refers to this as “dual-use
defense.”409 The current EIS Chief’s program management emphasis is concurrent with
Heymann’s recommendations. As Hamilton put it, “My job is to help hold the line [in the
face of budget cuts and political pressure] to keep epi training broad-based and to
maintain the historical perspective.”410 This charge is not easy to execute in the face of
political pressure.
Hamilton notes the politicization of the EIS, and the CDC in general, since the
mid-nineties. “The Directors from outside the CDC don’t have the same appreciation of
EIS as those who grew up with it or in it. I think they need to have a better appreciation
of it in order to continue its work [at its current high level].” He worries that the “trend is
to fit EIS into whatever health need fits the political direction of the day.”411 The focus
of the current U.S. administration in foreign policy has been the “War on Terror.” This
has affected the perception of the EIS. “There are some that would make the EIS the ‘bioterror investigation branch.’ Our focus is to avoid becoming a ‘one-topic’ program.”412
And then there are the budget battles.
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“The biggest factor affecting our future is budget cuts,” Hamilton noted one day.
Classes had been averaging around 70 or so officers when he began as Chief in 1998. The
emergency funding in 2001 allowed an additional 14 officers to be assigned to states
starting with the class of 2002, boosting the total to 89, the largest in the history of the
program.413 The classes stayed around 80 though with the fiscal year 2006 budget cuts,
the incoming class in July will be smaller. “We’ll be around 60, best case,” he said.414
Further discussing budget issues, Hamilton said that investigations within the U.S. are
met by the EIS budget while international requests are funded mostly by USAID (United
States Agency for International Development). One of the effects of the reduced budget
allocation was the need to stop publishing The EIS Bulletin. “We get about $12 million,
85% of that goes to salaries. That leaves only 15% for operating expenses.” When asked
about the effect of the funding decrease on training, Hamilton said, “We may change
some aspects of training but not because of budget cuts… The EIS needs to grow and
adapt to changes in the public health world so we do a systematic re-evaluation of the
training.”415
A recent variation in the normal EIS routine was due to the current bio-terror
threat, again a major concern of public health. It resulted in a major change in the
Summer Training Course starting in 2002. The course was lengthened from 3 weeks to 4
with the extra week held at the Nobel Training Center in Anniston, Alabama where the
officers experienced responding to a simulated bio-terrorist attack. It was made more
realistic by having the officers wear the somewhat cumbersome “Level C” protective
suits. The additional sessions were on other personal protective equipment, collaboration
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with law enforcement, risk communications, and expanded training on potential terrorist
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Training was also introduced for a new
smallpox response team as fears grew that the virus, which now only exists in two
laboratories, might somehow fall into the wrong hands and be turned into a weapon. The
occasion provided Hamilton with an opportunity to connect the class with the history of
one of CDC’s finest moments. The smallpox response training was delivered by EIS
veterans, F. Michael Lane, M.D. (EIS ’63) and Stanley Foster, M.D. (EIS ’62) who were
instrumental in eradicating smallpox in the 1960s and 1970s.416 Though it is important to
provide continuity in training, the Chief must necessarily alter it, as with the extra bioterror courses, in order to meet the expectations of the American people as expressed
through their representatives, the Congress.
Hamilton is also concerned to make the program better and will not hesitate to
make changes when officers and staff recommend improvements. An innovation that
occurred on Hamilton’s “watch” was the series of “in-house” site visits similar to the
regular visits to supervisors and co-workers undertaken by state branch to officers in the
field. The Atlanta-based officers requested an evaluation similar to that of officers in field
locations. “These visits have proven to be useful in helping us identify concerns of both
the officers and the supervisors,” Hamilton wrote. He also noted that one direct result of
the new activity was the reinstitution of formal training sessions for EIS supervisors in
the Atlanta branches.417
The venerable Epidemic Intelligence Service is in its 55th year. Founded in time
of war, both “cold” and “hot,” it has served in many capacities all over the globe. The
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program continues to grow and change while staying firmly rooted in the tradition of
field epidemiology training as prescribed by its founder, Alexander Langmuir and
envisioned by Joseph Mountin, “Father of the CDC,” in the 1940s. The role of the EIS
Chief has evolved with the organization. The Chiefs have been men and women of
differing personalities and various strengths. They have come from different backgrounds
and have served under very different Directors of Epidemiology and Training. The one
constant has been their presence in relation to the officers both in-house at the Atlanta
headquarters and stationed in the field. The people in this little-known role have had a
far-reaching effect on the program and its officers. This was brought home in the fall of
2001. The terrorist attacks, both suicide and anthrax, presented the EIS with almost
simultaneous major crises. Hearing from the Chief how it was handled offers some
insight into how the role is performed under pressure and illustrates the importance of the
person “on the spot.”
The EIS normally holds a Tuesday Morning Seminar on an epidemiology topic
every week. Just prior to the opening of the session on September 11, 2001, Hamilton
was informed by Epidemiology Program Office (EPO) Director Dr. Stephen Thacker that
an airplane had struck one of the World Trade Center office towers in New York City and
what did he want to do. Thinking it was a “nut in a Piper Cub [small airplane],” Hamilton
elected to say nothing and to start the seminar. When midway through the question-andanswer session he was told about the strike against the Pentagon, the seminar was
canceled. Everyone rushed to watch the television news. Recalling the moment, the Chief
said, “Like most Americans I was shocked, confused, and nervous.” Soon, all “nonessential” staff members were asked to leave the building. The head of CDC’s
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Emergency Operations Center (EOC) requested that EPO maintain a 24 hours-a-day,
seven-days-a-week presence in the EOC. Manning the EIS desk, Hamilton recalls, “That
was the beginning of what was a seven-week-long scheduling marathon” at the time and,
after a slight break, continued for longer than that. He assigned two officers to the EOC
whom he eventually detailed to New York later that day. When the request came in two
days later for 20 officers to do epidemiologic surveillance, Hamilton sent out an e-mail
message alerting the EIS to the possibility that volunteers might be needed. A bit worried
that they might not be forthcoming, he hinted in the message that he would have to assign
people to the mission if enough did not “step up.” Failing to get volunteers and needing
to assign officers was “something I had not had to do in 4 years.” By the time the actual
request for 34 officers reached his desk on Thursday, 120 officers had volunteered. As he
proudly recalls, “On that day, with the exception of military aircraft on patrol, there were
only two airplanes in U.S. airspace; Air Force 1 and the plane carrying EIS officers [to
New York City].” In all, 75 officers were deployed to NYC and 122 of the 146 officers
were on post-“9/11” assignments.418
The Chief, it seems, is also the historical memory of the EIS Program. In the
aftermath of the “9/11” activities, Hamilton remembered Langmuir’s early efforts. As he
said in the quarterly EIS Bulletin that fall, “It’s ironic when you consider that one of the
big sticks that Alex Langmuir used to get the EIS off and running was the threat of
clandestine attack with biological weapons. Now, after 50 years of training ‘applied
epidemiologists,’ the current EIS officers had to face that eventuality … and they have
risen to meet the challenge magnificently.”419 Langmuir had also created the role of the
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Chief to guide the program as well as the individual officers. The judgment Hamilton
subsequently rendered in an interview about the EIS could have been said of the Chief’s
position in general and his own performance in that specific crisis. “Alex Langmuir was a
pretty smart guy!”420
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